Who is powerful?: Examining preferences and testing sources of bargaining strength at European intergovernmental conferences

European Union Politics

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 51-76

  Slapin, Jonathan B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Intergovernmental conference; Ratification constraints; Spatial models; Treaty of Amsterdam; Two level games

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646435256     PISSN: 14651165     EISSN: 17412757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1465116506060912     Document Type: Article

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