Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: The long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 31, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 2108-2133

  Dawid, Herbert ^a  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Basins of attraction; Evolutionary stability; Imitation; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247637224     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.002     Document Type: Article

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