The evolution of cooperation through imitation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 293-315

  Levine, David K ^a   Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Evolutionary stable outcomes; Imitation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751519390     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.007     Document Type: Article

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