Evolution to equilibrium in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 9, 2001, Pages 1423-1440

  Tanaka, Yasuhito ^a  

^a CHUO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods, Finite population ESS, Stochastically stable state

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035502055     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(00)00058-8     Document Type: Article

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