Central Bank accountability and transparency: Theory and some evidence

International Finance

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 73-96

  Eijffinger, Sylvester C W ^a   Hoeberichts, Marco ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b Center for Financial Studies   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; BANKING; CENTRAL BANK; INFLATION; MONETARY POLICY;

EID: 0036058090     PISSN: 13670271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2362.00088     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences
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3. Alice in Euroland
4. The relationship between the inflation rate and its variability: The issues reconsidered
5. The democratic accountability of the European Central Bank: A comment on two fairy-tales
6. Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and quantification
7. A theory of Central Bank accountability
8. Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts
9. The Eurosystem: Transparent and accountable or "Willem in Euroland"
10. Optimal commitment in monetary policy: Credibility versus flexibility
11. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target
12. Monetary policy uncertainty and inflation: The role of Central Bank accountability
13. Central banking in a democratic society
14. Asymmetric density forecasts of inflation and the bank of England's fan chart national