Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 3-24

  Konishi, Hideo ^a   Ünver, M Utku ^b  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947706200     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0097-z     Document Type: Article

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