A wide range no-regret theorem

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 101-115

  Lehrer, Ehud ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Approachability; Regret free strategy; Replacing scheme; Sequential decision problem

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038404996     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00032-0     Document Type: Review

References (12)

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