The veil of uncertainty unveiled

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 5-17

  Müller, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DUISBURG ESSEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649084613     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009087329422     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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3. Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J. M. (1980) The Power to Tax. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press.
4. Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J. M. (1985) The Reason of Rules. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press.
5. Buchanan, J. M. (1977) Freedom in Constitutional Contract. College Station-London: Texas A&M University Press.
6. Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
7. Cooper, R., DeJong, D., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T (1990) "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Result." American Economic Review 80: 218-33.
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11. Metha, J., Starmer, C., and Sugden, R. (1994a) "Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An Experimental Investigation." Theory and Decision 36: 163-85.
12. Metha, J., Starmer, C., and Sugden, R. (1994b) "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games." American Economic Review 84: 658-73.
13. Rapoport, A., and Chammah, A. (1965) Prisoner's Dilemma. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
14. Schelling, T. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. London et al.: Oxford University Press.
15. Sugden, R. (1995) "A Theory of Focal Points." Economic Journal 105: 533-50.
16. Vanberg, V., and Buchanan, J. M. (1989) "Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1: 49-62.