Fair allocation of production externalities: Recent results

Revue d'Economie Politique

Volumn 117, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 7-36

  Moulin, Hervé ^a   Sprumont, Yves ^b  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Canada H3A 2T7   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cost sharing methods; Fairness; Responsibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947273052     PISSN: 03732630     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/redp.171.0007     Document Type: Article

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