The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism for allocating congestion costs

Operations Research Letters

Volumn 29, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 211-215

  Haviv, Moshe ^a,b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Congestion; Externalities; Pricing

Indexed keywords

OPERATIONS RESEARCH; SERVERS; THEOREM PROVING; VECTORS;

CONGESTION COSTS; QUEUEING SYSTEMS;

QUEUEING THEORY;

EID: 0035687840     PISSN: 01676377     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6377(01)00096-7     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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