-
1
-
-
0002389286
-
Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring
-
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David and Stacchetti, Ennio. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring." Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, 39(1), pp. 251-69.
-
(1986)
Journal of Economic Theory
, vol.39
, Issue.1
, pp. 251-269
-
-
Abreu, D.1
Pearce, D.2
Stacchetti, E.3
-
2
-
-
33846013707
-
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
-
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David and Stacchetti, Ennio. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring." Econometrica, 1990, 58(5), pp. 1041-63.
-
(1990)
Econometrica
, vol.58
, Issue.5
, pp. 1041-1063
-
-
Abreu, D.1
Pearce, D.2
Stacchetti, E.3
-
3
-
-
2542526839
-
Incomplete Social Contracts
-
Aghion, Philippe and Bolton, Patrick. "Incomplete Social Contracts." Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, 1(1), pp. 38-67.
-
(2003)
Journal of the European Economic Association
, vol.1
, Issue.1
, pp. 38-67
-
-
Aghion, P.1
Bolton, P.2
-
4
-
-
0035621417
-
Optimal Collusion with Private Information
-
Athey, Susan and Bagwell, Kyle. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information." RAND Journal of Economics, 2001, 52(3), pp. 428-65.
-
(2001)
RAND Journal of Economics
, vol.52
, Issue.3
, pp. 428-465
-
-
Athey, S.1
Bagwell, K.2
-
5
-
-
1942437402
-
Collusion and Price Rigidity
-
Athey, Susan; Bagwell, Kyle and Sanchirico, Chris. "Collusion and Price Rigidity." Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71(2), pp. 317-49.
-
(2004)
Review of Economic Studies
, vol.71
, Issue.2
, pp. 317-349
-
-
Athey, S.1
Bagwell, K.2
Sanchirico, C.3
-
6
-
-
0030102652
-
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
-
Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem." American Political Science Review, 1996, 90(1), pp. 34-45.
-
(1996)
American Political Science Review
, vol.90
, Issue.1
, pp. 34-45
-
-
Austen-Smith, D.1
Banks, J.S.2
-
7
-
-
4043167688
-
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
-
Barbera, Salvador and Jackson, Matthew O. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119(3), pp. 1011-48.
-
(2004)
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, vol.119
, Issue.3
, pp. 1011-1048
-
-
Barbera, S.1
Jackson, M.O.2
-
8
-
-
0035185264
-
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
-
Barbera, Salvador; Maschler, Michael and Shalev, Jonathan. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution." Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 37(1), pp. 40-78.
-
(2001)
Games and Economic Behavior
, vol.37
, Issue.1
, pp. 40-78
-
-
Barbera, S.1
Maschler, M.2
Shalev, J.3
-
10
-
-
0000297156
-
On 64%-Majority Rule
-
Caplin, Andrew S. and Nalebuff, Barry J. "On 64%-Majority Rule." Econometrica, 1988, 55(4), pp. 787-814.
-
(1988)
Econometrica
, vol.55
, Issue.4
, pp. 787-814
-
-
Caplin, A.S.1
Nalebuff, B.J.2
-
11
-
-
0034418766
-
Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions
-
Carrubba, Clifford J. and Volden, Craig. "Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions." American Journal of Political Science, 2000, 44(2), pp. 261-77.
-
(2000)
American Journal of Political Science
, vol.44
, Issue.2
, pp. 261-277
-
-
Carrubba, C.J.1
Volden, C.2
-
12
-
-
18644381344
-
Storable Votes
-
Casella, Alessandra. "Storable Votes." Games and Economic Behavior, 2005, 51(2), pp. 391-419.
-
(2005)
Games and Economic Behavior
, vol.51
, Issue.2
, pp. 391-419
-
-
Casella, A.1
-
14
-
-
77956859417
-
Sovereign Debt
-
Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North-Holland
-
Eaton, Jonathan and Fernandez, Raquel. "Sovereign Debt," in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., Handbook of international economics. Vol. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North-Holland, 1995, pp. 2031-77.
-
(1995)
Handbook of international economics
, vol.3
, pp. 2031-2077
-
-
Eaton, J.1
Fernandez, R.2
-
16
-
-
0038905591
-
Unanimity and Majority Rule: The Calculus of Consent Reconsidered
-
Guttman, Joel M. "Unanimity and Majority Rule: The Calculus of Consent Reconsidered." European Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 14(2), pp. 189-207.
-
(1998)
European Journal of Political Economy
, vol.14
, Issue.2
, pp. 189-207
-
-
Guttman, J.M.1
-
17
-
-
84963001788
-
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
-
Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies, 1994, 61(2), pp. 327-55.
-
(1994)
Review of Economic Studies
, vol.61
, Issue.2
, pp. 327-355
-
-
Ledyard, J.O.1
Palfrey, T.R.2
-
18
-
-
0036176621
-
The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes
-
Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. "The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes." Journal of Public Economics, 2002, 83(2), pp. 153-71.
-
(2002)
Journal of Public Economics
, vol.83
, Issue.2
, pp. 153-171
-
-
Ledyard, J.O.1
Palfrey, T.R.2
-
19
-
-
2642542249
-
Relational Incentive Contracts
-
Levin, Jonathan. "Relational Incentive Contracts." American Economic Review, 2003, 93(3), pp. 835-57.
-
(2003)
American Economic Review
, vol.93
, Issue.3
, pp. 835-857
-
-
Levin, J.1
-
20
-
-
33847643125
-
-
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers
-
Maggi, Giovanni and Morelli, Massimo. "Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations." National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., NBER Working Papers: No. 10102, 2003.
-
(2003)
Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations
, Issue.10102
-
-
Maggi, G.1
Morelli, M.2
-
21
-
-
0000661802
-
A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decisions
-
May, Kenneth O. "A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decisions." Econometrica, 1952, 20(4), pp. 680-84.
-
(1952)
Econometrica
, vol.20
, Issue.4
, pp. 680-684
-
-
May, K.O.1
-
22
-
-
0842312525
-
Voting on Majority Rules
-
Messner, Matthias and Polborn, Mattias K. "Voting on Majority Rules." Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71(1), pp. 115-32.
-
(2004)
Review of Economic Studies
, vol.71
, Issue.1
, pp. 115-132
-
-
Messner, M.1
Polborn, M.K.2
-
23
-
-
84971116267
-
Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice
-
Rae, Douglas W. "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice." American Political Science Review, 1969, 53(1), pp. 40-56.
-
(1969)
American Political Science Review
, vol.53
, Issue.1
, pp. 40-56
-
-
Rae, D.W.1
-
24
-
-
30844473872
-
Dynamic Voting in Clubs
-
London School of Economics, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
-
Roberts, Kevin W. "Dynamic Voting in Clubs." London School of Economics, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, Theoretical Economies Paper Series: No. 367, 1999.
-
(1999)
Theoretical Economies Paper Series
, vol.367
-
-
Roberts, K.W.1
-
26
-
-
77956813804
-
International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy
-
Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North-Holland
-
Staiger, Robert W. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., Handbook of international economics. Vol. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North-Holland, 1995, pp. 1495-1551.
-
(1995)
Handbook of international economics
, vol.3
, pp. 1495-1551
-
-
Staiger, R.W.1
-
27
-
-
0039039207
-
Proof of a Theorem on Majority Rule
-
Taylor, Michael J. "Proof of a Theorem on Majority Rule." Behavioral Science, 1969, 14(3), pp. 228-31.
-
(1969)
Behavioral Science
, vol.14
, Issue.3
, pp. 228-231
-
-
Taylor, M.J.1
|