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Volumn 96, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1137-1158

Self-enforcing voting in international organizations

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EID: 33847651030     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1137     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (63)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.