A characterization of interim efficiency with public goods

Econometrica

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 435-448

  Ledyard, John O ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042549856     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00028     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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