Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 281-310

  D'Aspremont, Claude ^a   Crémer, Jacques ^b   Gérard Varet, Louis André ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242287769     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0260-8     Document Type: Conference Paper

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