Geographic proximity, trade, and international conflict/cooperation

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-24

  Robst, John ^a   Polachek, Solomon ^b   Chang, Yuan Ching ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA   (United States)

^b BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CHINESE CULTURE UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Conflict; Cooperation; Distance; Geographic proximity; International interactions; International relations; Trade

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847106893     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940600837680     Document Type: Article

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