Corporate governance: What can we learn from public governance?

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 92-104

  Benz, Matthias ^a   Frey, Bruno S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846644885     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2007.23463860     Document Type: Review

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