Optimal incentives for sequential production processes

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 376-390

  Winter, Eyal ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846125980     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00021.x     Document Type: Review

References (16)

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