Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random-order bargaining

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 439-460

  Segal, Ilya ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING;

EID: 0038135317     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00251     Document Type: Article

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