Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 140-156

  Strausz, Roland ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001157299     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2496     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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