Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 152-166

  Fisher, Stephen D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346040470     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123403220391     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. A. Heath, R. Jowell, J. Curtice, G. Evans, J. Field and S. Witherspoon, Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964-1987 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991), chap. 4.
2. Details of the surveys can be found in Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice with B. Taylor, eds, Labour's Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond (Aldershot, Surrey: Dartmouth, 1994); G. Evans and P. Norris, eds, Critical Elections, British Parties and Voters in Long Term Perspective (London: Sage, 1999).
3. Details of the surveys can be found in Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice with B. Taylor, eds, Labour's Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond (Aldershot, Surrey: Dartmouth, 1994); G. Evans and P. Norris, eds, Critical Elections, British Parties and Voters in Long Term Perspective (London: Sage, 1999).
4. Details of the surveys can be found in Heath et al., Understanding Political Change; A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice with B. Taylor, eds, Labour's Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond (Aldershot, Surrey: Dartmouth, 1994); G. Evans and P. Norris, eds, Critical Elections, British Parties and Voters in Long Term Perspective (London: Sage, 1999).
5. For example, G. Cox, Making Votes Count (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Note that 'tactical voting' is the same as the US term 'strategic voting'. Although the terms are synonymous and this author is indifferent between them, there is a case for using the word 'tactical' rather than 'strategic', based on etymology. Whilst strategy suggests a sequence of actions, a tactic is a single manœuvre. Since strategic voting is utility maximizing for a single election only, the term 'tactical' is probably more appropriate. The term 'sophisticated voting' has also been used, though as Shepsle argues, it is more appropriate for voting on bills and amendments when there are well-defined agenda rules; K. A. Shepsle, Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition (Chur: Harwood, 1991), pp. 62-3.
6. For example, G. Cox, Making Votes Count (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Note that 'tactical voting' is the same as the US term 'strategic voting'. Although the terms are synonymous and this author is indifferent between them, there is a case for using the word 'tactical' rather than 'strategic', based on etymology. Whilst strategy suggests a sequence of actions, a tactic is a single manœeuvre. Since strategic voting is utility maximizing for a single election only, the term 'tactical' is probably more appropriate. The term 'sophisticated voting' has also been used, though as Shepsle argues, it is more appropriate for voting on bills and amendments when there are well-defined agenda rules; K. A. Shepsle, Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition (Chur: Harwood, 1991), pp. 62-3.
7. A. Alesina and H. Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
8. One exception to this rule is Niemi et al. who define tactical voting solely by having tactical considerations; R. G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 229-54, pp. 229-30. In later work they went on to distinguish between instrumental and expressive tactical voting.
9. R.G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'People Who Live in Glass Houses: A Response to Evans and Heath's Critique of our Note on Tactical Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 549-63. Also on this point see S. Bowler, 'Reasoning Voters, Voter Behaviour and Institutions: The Decision Dependence of Voting Behaviour', in D. M. Farrell, D. Broughton, D. Denver and J. Fisher, eds, British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1996 (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
10. R.G. Niemi, G. Whitten and M. N. Franklin, 'People Who Live in Glass Houses: A Response to Evans and Heath's Critique of our Note on Tactical Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 549-63. Also on this point see S. Bowler, 'Reasoning Voters, Voter Behaviour and Institutions: The Decision Dependence of Voting Behaviour', in D. M. Farrell, D. Broughton, D. Denver and J. Fisher, eds, British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1996 (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
11. R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook, 'A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting', in J. F. Herndon and J. L. Bernd, eds, Mathematical Applications in Political Science, vol.6 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972).
12. Whether or not it is sensible to assume that people vote and are short-term instrumentally rational at the same time is a separate question. The assumption is simply necessary to elucidate the nature of tactical voting under rational choice theory.
13. McKelvey and Ordeshook, 'A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting'; T. R. Palfrey, 'A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law', in P. C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; Cox, Making Votes Count; D. P. Myatt, 'A New Theory of Strategic Voting', Nuffield College Economics Discussion Paper 1999-W21.
14. McKelvey and Ordeshook, 'A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting'; T. R. Palfrey, 'A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law', in P. C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; Cox, Making Votes Count; D. P. Myatt, 'A New Theory of Strategic Voting', Nuffield College Economics Discussion Paper 1999-W21.
15. McKelvey and Ordeshook, 'A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting'; T. R. Palfrey, 'A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law', in P. C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; Cox, Making Votes Count; D. P. Myatt, 'A New Theory of Strategic Voting', Nuffield College Economics Discussion Paper 1999-W21.
16. McKelvey and Ordeshook, 'A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting'; T. R. Palfrey, 'A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law', in P. C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; Cox, Making Votes Count; D. P. Myatt, 'A New Theory of Strategic Voting', Nuffield College Economics Discussion Paper 1999-W21.
17. McKelvey and Ordeshook, 'A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting'; T. R. Palfrey, 'A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law', in P. C. Ordeshook, ed., Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); D. T. Hoffman, 'A Model for Strategic Voting', SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 42 (1982), 751-61; Cox, Making Votes Count; D. P. Myatt, 'A New Theory of Strategic Voting', Nuffield College Economics Discussion Paper 1999-W21.
18. D. P. Myatt, 'Multi-Party Tactical Voting Incentives', Nuffield College Economics Discussion Paper 2000-W19.
19. One possibility is that a voter may be extremely uncertain what share of the vote A will get (so that any share between 0 per cent and 100 per cent is equally likely) but very sure that B and C will get almost the same share of the vote. Whilst not impossible, this would be an odd set of beliefs and there is no election that this author knows of where this could have been expected.
20. M. Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954).
21. M. N. Franklin, R. G. Niemi and G. Whitten, 'The Two Faces of Tactical Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 126-36, p. 549.
22. Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1998).
23. Niemi et al. 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', pp. 229-30.
24. A. Heath and G. Evans, 'Tactical Voting: Concepts, Measurement and Findings', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 557-61, p. 558.
25. A. Blais and R. Nadeau, 'Measuring Strategic Voting: A Two-Step Procedure', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 39-52.
26. J. G. Neal, 'A Sophisticated Voter Model of Preferential Electoral Systems', in S. Bowler and B. Grofman, eds, Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 59-78.
27. W. S. Robinson, 'Ecological Correlation and Behaviour of Individuals', American Sociological Review, 15 (1950), 351-7.
28. Fisher, Tactical Voting in England 1987-1997, chap. 7.
29. Blais and Nadeau, 'Measuring Strategic Voting'.
30. G. King, 'How Not to Lie with Statistics: Avoiding Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science', American Journal of Political Science, 30 (1986), 666-87, pp. 667-9.
31. R. M. Alvarez and J. Nagler, 'A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 57-75.
32. Heath et al., Understanding Political Change, Table III.2A.
33. Alvarez and Nagler, 'A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections', p. 73. Actually, the method as described in the paragraph above Table 3 on p. 73 is ambiguous. I assume that there is a mistaken reference to 'row entries' instead of 'column entries' in the third sentence.
34. Heath et al., Understanding Political Change, chap. 4.
35. G. Evans, 'On the Validation of Measures of Strategic Motivations: A Critical Comment on Alvarez and Nagler', British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 185-8.
36. Franklin et al., 'The Two Faces of Tactical Voting'.
37. For details, see Niemi et al., 'People Who Live in Glass Houses', pp. 550-1.
38. Heath and Evans, 'Tactical Voting', p. 559.
39. Heath and Evans, 'Tactical Voting', p. 561.
40. Franklin et al., 'The Two Faces of Tactical Voting', Table 2, p. 551.
41. G. Evans, 'Tactical Voting and Labour's Prospects', in Heath, Jowell and Curtice with Taylor, eds, Labour's Last Chance?, pp. 65-84, at fn. 5, p. 80.
42. Heath et al., Understanding Political Change, Table 4.6 n.
43. Niemi et al., 'People Who Live in Glass Houses', pp. 550-1.
44. Evans, 'Tactical Voting and Labour's Prospects', fn. 6, p. 81.
45. These two criteria are not the same but since they can be fulfilled simultaneously it is sensible to combine them in Table 2.
46. For example, Evans, 'Tactical Voting and Labour's Prospects', and E. A. Fieldhouse, C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'Tactical Voting and Party Constituency Campaigning at the 1992 General Election in England', British Journal of Political Science, 26 (1996), 403-39.
47. For example, Evans, 'Tactical Voting and Labour's Prospects', and E. A. Fieldhouse, C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, 'Tactical Voting and Party Constituency Campaigning at the 1992 General Election in England', British Journal of Political Science, 26 (1996), 403-39.
48. Franklin et al., 'The Two Faces of Tactical Voting', p. 552.
49. A few respondents were found to have a negative gap between the first and second preference parties. This is possible only when a non-tactical voter gives a lower strength-of-feeling score to the party they voted for than they give to the other main two parties and when these two parties receive the same score. This is a bizarre set of responses that suggests coding error.
50. Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', p. 223; G. Evans and A. Heath, 'A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 131-7; Evans, 'Tactical Voting and Labour's Prospects', pp. 74-5.
51. Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', p. 223; G. Evans and A. Heath, 'A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 131-7; Evans, 'Tactical Voting and Labour's Prospects', pp. 74-5.
52. Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', p. 223; G. Evans and A. Heath, 'A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 131-7; Evans, 'Tactical Voting and Labour's Prospects', pp. 74-5.
53. The association between the probability of being rejected and the distance from contention is never statistically significant. Also a chi-squared goodness of fit test easily shows that the rejects do not fit the observed distribution of those in the revised measure. Note that it is not possible to test whether the rejects and the remaining tactical voters were drawn from the same distribution because the observations are not independent.
54. Niemi et al., 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', p. 232.
55. Myatt, 'A New Theory of Strategic Voting'.