Globalization and its history

Journal of Modern History

Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 899-931

  Lang, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MAINE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846023027     PISSN: 00222801     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/511251     Document Type: Review

References (253)

1. Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in his Poetry, Language, Thought (New York, 1971), 154.
2. Quote from David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, eds., The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (Malden, MA, 2000), 1.
3. Zygmunt Bauman, "Wars of the Globalization Era," European Journal of Social Theory 4, no. 1 (2001): 11-28;
4. Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York, 1994), 383.
5. For the former, John Gray, "Where There Is No Common Power," Harper's (December 2001): 15-19;
6. for the latter, Eli Zaretsky, "Trauma and Dereification: September 11 and the Problem of Ontological Security," Constellations 9, no. 1 (2002): 98-105;
7. and David Kirkpatrick, "After September 11, One Thing Has Become Painfully Clear: We All Live in One World for Better or for Worse," Fortune, November 26, 2001, 74-110 (see esp. lead commentary by author, commentary by economist Joseph E. Stiglitz, and interview with German media executive Andreas Schmidt).
8. See also Rob Lever, "Iraq Rift Threatens US-EU Engine of Global Economy: Experts," EUbusiness.com, March 19, 2003, http://www.eubusiness.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id= 105886;
9. David North, "Into the Maelstrom: The Crisis of American Imperialism and the War against Iraq," World Socialist Web Site, April 1, 2003, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/apr2003/dn-a01.shtml.
10. From the preparatory talks at Geneva for the UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, reported on All Things Considered, National Public Radio, July 30, 2001 (archived at http://www.npr.org/ramfiles/atc/20010730.atc.15.ram).
11. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash, "Globalization, Modernity, and the Spatialization of Social Theory: An Introduction," in Global Modernities, ed. Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson (London, 1995), 1-24, 1.
12. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA, 1990), 64.
13. Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (New York, 2000).
14. Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York, 1990);
15. Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution Is Transforming Our World (New York, 1992);
16. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The End of the Nation-State, trans. Victoria Elliot (Minneapolis, 1995);
17. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge, 1996).
18. James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge, 1997), 7;
19. Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63, no. 1 (1999): 10-39;
20. Jan Aart Scholte, "Globalisation: Prospects for a Paradigm Shift," in Politics and Globalisation: Knowledge, Ethics, and Agency, ed. Martin Shaw (London, 1999), 9-22;
21. Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London, 1995), 158;
22. Zygmunt Bauman. Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York, 1998), where we find "the new freedom of capital," "new speed, new polarization," "new extraterritoriality," "the new expropriation," "the new global elite," and so on (10, 18, 23, 65, 125).
23. Of many such examples to "the new millennium," see Waters, Globalization, 1;
24. Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler, eds., Re-Imagining Political Community (Stanford, CA, 1998), 1.
25. Robert Zevin, "Are World Financial Markets More Open? If So, Why and with What Effects?" in Financial Openness and National Autonomy, ed. Tariq Banuri and Juliet B. Schor (Oxford, 1992), 43-83;
26. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner, "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1995): 1-118;
27. Robert Wade, "Globalization and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are Greatly Exaggerated," in National Diversity and Global Capitalism, ed. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Philip Dore (Ithaca, NY, 1996), 60-88.
28. See, e.g., Archibugi et al., Re-Imagining Political Community, 1.
29. Reinhart Koselleck, "'Neuzeit': Remarks on the Semantics of the Modern Concept of Movement," in his Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, 1985), 250.
30. For Bretton Woods foundations, Barry J. Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, NJ, 1996), 96-106;
31. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY, 1994), 25-50.
32. For Bretton Woods' early development theories, Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., Pioneers in Development (Oxford, 1984).
33. Raúl Prebisch, Economic Survey of Latin America (New York, 1950);
34. and Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York, 1957);
35. more recently, Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, NJ, 1995).
36. For a review of dependency theory, Dudley Seers, Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment (London, 1981).
37. For the system's problems and its breakdown, Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York, 1968);
38. Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital, 113-39;
39. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence, 81-124.
40. On the effects of the decision to float exchange rates, Jeffrey A. Frankel, On Exchange Rates (Cambridge, 1993), 10-21.
41. A key inaugurating text reflecting divergent orientations and perspectives is Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, 1972).
42. See particularly in ibid. Lawrence Krause, "Private International Finance," 173-90, 189.
43. For a review of the field, Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics." International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 645-85.
44. Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour: Structural Unemployment in Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in Developing Countries (Cambridge, 1980), 8, 13.
45. Theodore Levitt, "The Globalization of Markets," Harvard Business Review 83, no. 3 (1983): 92-102, 93, 96, 94.
46. Mauro F. Guillén, "Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature," Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 235-60, charts a history of the literature based on the number of citations in several leading bibliographic indexes. Though a useful survey of some of the leading positions, the piece does not consider periodization to be a key debate.
47. The first edition of this book was published in 1996; references are to the 1999 edition, cited above. Sections discussed here are the same in both editions, save for page number.
48. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, CA, 1995), 133 (entire passage italicized in original).
49. Based on Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Science citation search, April 3, 2005.
50. Akira Iriye, "Internationalizing International History," in Rethinking American History in a Global Age, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, CA, 2002), 47-62, 61 n. 17;
51. Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives (New York, 2000), 84;
52. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed., vol. 1, Information Age (Oxford, 2000), 101.
53. Alfred Kleinknecht and Jan ter Wengel, "The Myth of Economic Globalization," Cambridge Journal of Economics 22 (1998): 637-47;
54. Theodore H. Moran, Beyond Sweatshops: Foreign Direct Investment and Globalization in Developing Countries (Washington, DC, 2002), 5-6;
55. Geoffrey Garrett, "Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?" International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 787-824.
56. Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies (Princeton, NJ, 2001), 101-22, 170-90;
57. Paul N. Doremus, The Myth of the Global Corporation (Princeton, NJ, 1998);
58. Louis W. Pauly and Simon Reich, "National Structures and Multinational Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization," International Organization 51, no. 1 (1997); 1-30;
59. John Zysman, "The Myth of a 'Global' Economy; Enduring National Foundations and Emerging Regional Realities," New Political Economy 1, no. 2 (1996): 157-84.
60. Ronald Philip Dore, British Factory, Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations (Berkeley, CA, and Los Angeles, 1973), the groundbreaking work on the national origins of modern business development, insisted on the importance of a nation's preindustrial social structures, the relative power of the state, the ideology of elites, the nation's history in war, strategic needs, resource allotments, population density, and racial divisions. For Dore, twentieth-century industrialization has been determined neither by a single model of development nor by "unique" national-cultural characteristics but by overlapping and divergent national histories. For international investment strategies,
61. see W. Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (London, 1995), a large-scale study of the world's one hundred largest multinationals ("[None] has managed to overcome its base. Globalization remains a myth," 169 and see also 129-30);
62. and Alan M. Rugman, The End of Globalization: Why Global Strategy Is a Myth and How to Profit from the Realities of Regional Markets (New York, 2001), 218.
63. World Bank, "Total GDP 2003" (2005), http://www.worldbank.org/ data/databytopic/GDP.pdf;
64. World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2004 (Geneva, 2005), Tables 1.5 and 1.7, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/ its2004_e/its04_bysubject_e.htm. For Africa,
65. Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton, NJ, 2000), 21.
66. Kleinknecht and ter Wenzel, "The Myth," tabulations at 640, quote from 638. Current numbers for North America reveal regionalization in sharp relief. The United States absorbs about 90 percent of all Mexican exports and nearly 80 percent of those from Canada. About two-thirds of Mexican and Canadian imports come from the United States (U.S. Embassy in Mexico, "The U.S. and Mexico at a Glance" [2004], http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/ eataglance1.htm#trade). For Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Trade Update 2004" (2004), table 1C, http:// www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eet/trade/state-of-trade-en.asp.
67. Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System (Washington, DC, 1997).
68. Hak-Min Kim, Globalization of International Financial Markets: Causes and Consequences (Aldershot, 1999), 101;
69. Alejandro López-Mejía, "Large Capital Flows: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses," Finance and Development 36, no. 3 (1999), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ fandd/1999/09/lopez.htm.
70. Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose, "Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence," International Monetary Fund (Washington, DC, 2003);
71. Louis W. Pauly, "National Financial Structures, Capital Mobility, and International Economic Rules: The Normative Consequences of East Asian, European, and American Distinctiveness," Policy Sciences 27 (1994): 343-63.
72. See also Andrew Carl Sobel, Domestic Choices, International Markets: Dismantling National Barriers and Liberalizing Securities Markets (Ann Arbor, MI, 1994);
73. Wade, "Globalization and Its Limits."
74. Frankel, On Exchange Rates, 68-69.
75. Francesca Sanna-Randaccio, "Globalization and Foreign Direct Investments: Towards a New Protectionism?" in Globalization, Institutions, and Social Cohesion, ed. Maurizio Franzini and Felice R. Pizzuti (Berlin, 2001), 59-72.
76. Mira Wilkins, "Multinational Corporations: An Historical Account," in Transnational Corporations and the Global Economy, ed. Richard Kozul-Wright and Robert Rowthorn (New York, 1998), 97-111.
77. See as well the discussion of nineteenth-century "free-standing companies," multinational enterprises with no home market designed solely as foreign direct investments, in Mira Wilkins and Harm G. Schröter, eds., The Free-Standing Company in the World Economy, 1830-1996 (Oxford, 1998).
78. For a 1913-90 comparison, Robert Feenstra, "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (1998): 38.
79. Hirst and Thompson compare the same period but with a different method of measurement and using the Netherlands instead of Sweden. Their numbers show, even more pointedly, Dutch and Japanese levels declining drastically and the rest in rough equivalence (27). For the 1990s, World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2001 (Geneva, 2001), 44, 60, 63-64.
80. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawana, and Benjamin D. Brewer, "Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System," American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (2000): 77-95, 88.
81. Using different methodologies and arriving at the same conclusion (though only to 1990), Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Paris, 1995), 227, 239.
82. See also Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz, and Alan M. Taylor, "The Rise and Fall of World Trade, 1870-1939," Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 2 (2003): 359-407;
83. as well as Paul Krugman, "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1995): 327-62.
84. Daniel Verdier, "Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization under the Gold Standard, 1870-1914," International Organization 52, no. 1 (1998): 1-34.
85. Geoffrey Jones, British Multinational Banking, 1830-1990 (Oxford, 1993);
86. P. L. Cottrell, "Great Britain," in International Banking, 1870-1914, ed. Rondo Cameron and V. I. Bovykin (Oxford, 1991), 25-47, 30-31;
87. Herbert Feis, Europe, the World's Banker, 1870-1914: An Account of European Foreign Investment and the Connection of World Finance with Diplomacy before World War I (New York, 1965);
88. Eichengreen cited in Sachs and Warner, "Economic Reform," 7.
89. Maurice Obstfeld, "The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (1998): 9-30.
90. Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, "Globalization and Capital Markets," National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 58-59.
91. Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000 (New York, 2001), 283-88.
92. Carlos Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression, 1820-1930 (Princeton, NJ, 1989);
93. Obstfeld and Taylor, "Globalization and Capital Markets," 58.
94. From the self-description of the authors' position in "The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction," in Held and McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader, 13.
95. John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (New York, 1998), 55-77;
96. John Gerard Ruggie, "At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1995): 507-26;
97. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, 82, 71;
98. Philip G. Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action," International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 592-625;
99. Martin Carnoy, "The Demise of the Nation-State?" Theoria 97 (2001): 69-81;
100. Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, ed. and trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge, 2001);
101. William I. Robinson, "Social Theory and Globalization: The Rise of a Transnational State," Theory and Society 30, no. 2 (2001): 157-200;
102. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, 2000).
103. For a general survey of different national industrial and development strategies, Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1998), 115-44.
104. For a focus on poor states, Mark A. Carlson and Leonardo Hernandez, "Determinants and Repercussions of the Composition of Capital Inflows," IMF Working Paper 02/86 (Washington, DC, 2002).
105. On China and Russia, Yingyi Qian, "The Process of China's Market Transition (1978-98): The Evolutionary, Historical, and Comparative Perspectives" (1999), Stanford University Economics Department, http:// www.econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp99012.html.
106. On post-Soviet Europe, Mitchell A, Orenstein and Martine R. Haas, "Globalization and Development of Welfare States in Postcommunist Europe," BCSIA Discussion Paper 2002-02,
107. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA, 2002), http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program = CORE&ctype = paper&ite m_id = 339;
108. and Robert Boyer, "The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of Nations?" in Berger and Dore, National Diversity and Global Capitalism, 29-59.
109. Fligstein, Architecture of Markets, 213-20;
110. Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge. 1998);
111. Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State?" World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 62-87.
112. During the recent steel dispute between the EU and the United States, both sides agreed that European companies were better able to consolidate because of their states' responsibility to fund pension and health benefits (Edmund L. Andrews, "Europe versus United States in Steel War," New York Times, March 26, 2002, C1). Within the United States, proposed stimulus packages following September 11 were substantively polarized between the Democratic plan to support middle, poor, and unemployed sectors and the Republican plan to refund corporate taxes.
113. Pauly, "National Financial Structures";
114. Steven Kent Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca, NY, 1996);
115. see also Gray, False Dawn, on the highly activist state in Thatcherite "deregulation" (24-34).
116. Nicholas Stern, "Open the Rich Markets to Poor Countries' Exports" (2001) World Bank, http:// www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/ speeches/nsoped-iht2.htm;
117. Keith E, Maskus, John S. Wilson, and Tsunehiro Otsuki, "Quantifying the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade: A Framework for Analysis" (2000), World Bank, http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type = 5&id = 1324.
118. Nicholas Kaldor, Economics without Equilibrium (Armonk, NY, 1985);
119. Paul A. David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review 72, no. 2 (1985): 332-37;
120. Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade (Cambridge, MA, 1991).
121. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, 1948), 243-63;
122. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979), 95-96, 131.
123. A nonrealist argument for Westphalian territoriality, Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton, NJ, 2001).
124. The text shifts freely between sovereignty as a theoretical "conception" and as a description of political reality. According to Jens Bartelson, this oscillation is symptomatic of all historical attempts to define "sovereignty" insofar as the mutual production of knowledge and power goes unrecognized (Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty [Cambridge, 1995]).
125. Competing against realism, though reliant on its state-centric historicization of Westphalia, are cosmopolitanism, in addition to Held et al., Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge, 1998);
126. neoliberal institutionalism, Robert O. Keohane, "Hoboes' Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics," in Whose World Order? ed. Hans Henrik Holm and Georg Sørensen (Boulder, CO, 1995), 165-86;
127. constructivism, John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139-74;
128. systems theory, Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier,
129. sociology of space, Scholte, Globalization;
130. sociology of war, Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge, 2000);
131. critical theory, Habermas, The Postnational Constellation;
132. Marxism, Robinson, "Social Theory and Globalization,"
133. and Hardt and Negri, Empire.
134. Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?" Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997): 472-96, 477.
135. Stephen D. Krasner, "Globalization and Sovereignty," in States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, ed. David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik (London, 1999), 39-52;
136. Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," International Security 20, no. 3 (1995-96): 115-51.
137. See also Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations (London, 1994);
138. and Justin Rosenberg, The Follies of Globalisation Theory: Polemical Essays (London, 2000).
139. Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 807-31;
140. similar periodization in P. H. H. Vries, "Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State in the Rise of the West," Journal of World History 13, no. 1 (2002): 67-138.
141. See additionally, for the national centralization of banks, Verdier, "Domestic Responses";
142. for the territorialization of currency, Eric Helleiner, "One Nation, One Money: Territorial Currencies and the Nation-State" (1997), Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State, University of Oslo, www.arena.uio.no/ publications/wp_97.htm; for the shift from federative to national political organization,
143. Robert Cedric Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871 (New York, 1935).
144. Most famously, this periodization is asserted in Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, CA. 1976).
145. Andreas Oriander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251-87.
146. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," 128-33; Marichal, A Century of Debt, 122-23, 149-70.
147. The tack taken by Held et al. to distinguish that era from the absence today of an economic hegemon (196).
148. Barry J. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (New York, 1992), 29-66;
149. The Collected Writing of [John Maynard] Keynes, vol. 6, bk. 2, A Treatise on Money (London, 1971), 151, 270-303. Held et al. attempt to deflect any contemporary comparison by critiquing Keynes's assessment: "Domestic monetary policy was never solely determined by global financial markets," a hyperbolic claim that Keynes did not make (196). They also overlook Keynes's suspicion and Eichengreen's confirmation that in short money, prewar London was as much a debtor as a creditor.
150. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 42-54;
151. see also the appropriate chapters in Cameron and Bovykin, International Banking, 1870-1914.
152. Despite their somewhat misleading titles, J. Lawrence Broz, The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System (Ithaca, NY, 1997),
153. and "Origins of the Federal Reserve System: International Incentives and the Domestic Free-Rider Problem," International Organization 53, no. 1 (1999): 39-70,
154. insist on the local, partisan, and distributional contestations over the creation of the U.S. Federal Reserve; similarly, Daniel Verdier, "Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets," International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 327-56, reports that levels of international capital mobility among the United States and European states heavily depended on the sectoral distribution of political power and the intensity of state centralization.
155. Richard Weiner, Race, Nation, and Market: Economic Culture in Porfirian Mexico (Tucson, AZ, 2004), 48-69;
156. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 54-65;
157. William G. Clarence-Smith, "The Modern Colonial State and Global Economic Integration," in Smith et al., States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, 99-135.
158. Herman Melville, Moby Dick or, the Whale (New York, 1992), 178.
159. In addition to the work discussed here, see esp. the papers available at the National Bureau of Economic Research, www.nber.org.
160. For factor-price convergence across the non-Atlantic world, see Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Land, Labor, and Globalization in the Third World, 1870-1940," Journal of Economic History 62, no. 1 (2002): 55-85.
161. Kevin H. O'Rourke, "Europe and the Causes of Globalization, 1790 to 2000," in Europe and Globalization, ed. Henryk Kierzkowski (Basingstoke, 2002), 64-86, 81-82.
162. For a state-by-state survey, Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development in Historical Perspective (London, 2002), 13-68.
163. Ibid., as well as Barry Supple, "The State and the Industrial Revolution," in The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 3, The Industrial Revolution, ed. Carlo M. Cipolla (London, 1973), 327-49, 344;
164. on the United States, Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (New York, 1960),
165. and Richard Kozul-Wright, "The Myth of Anglo-Saxon Capitalism: Reconstructing the History of the American State," in The Role of the State in Economic Change, ed. Ha-Joon Chang and Robert Rowthorn (Oxford, 1995), 81-113.
166. Benard Semmel. The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade, and Imperialism, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, 1970), 148;
167. Branko Milanovic, "The Two Faces of Globalization: Against Globalization as We Know It," World Bank (Washington, DC, 2003), 8.
168. Stanley L. Engerman, "Slavery and Its Consequences for the South in the Nineteenth Century, in The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, vol. 2, The Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman (Cambridge, 2000), 329-66;
169. A. Farnie, The English Cotton Industry and the World Market, 1815-1896 (Oxford, 1979), 137-38, 82.
170. On the War of the Triple Alliance, Bradford Burns, The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, CA, 1980); on the importance of both Paraguay and the U.S. Civil War,
171. Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars in Eurasia and America; The Geopolitics of War in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," Comparative Studies in Society and History 38, no. 4 (1996): 619-57, 638-48.
172. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," Economic History Review, second series, 6, no. 1 (1953): 1-15.
173. Ibid., 2-3.
174. E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire (Harmondsworth, 1968), 149;
175. Bairoch, Economics and World History, 89:
176. Farnie, English Cotton Industry, 137.
177. Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade."
178. Frederic Wakeman, "The Canton Trade and the Opium War," in The Cambridge History of China, ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, vol. 10, Late. Ch'ing, 1800-1911, pt. 1, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, 1978), 173:
179. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ, 2000), 285.
180. See also the work of Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, most recently, "Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century," Journal of World History 13, no. 2 (2002): 391-427, where a "highly integrated global economy" begins in the sixteenth century (392).
181. Richard von Glahn, "Money Use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500-1800," in Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800, ed. Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn (Aldershot, 2003), 187-205.
182. Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present (Armonk, NY, 1999).
183. Rhoades Murphey, The Outsiders: Western Experience in India and China (Ann Arbor, MI, 1977).
184. See the now-classic piece by Russell R. Menard, "Transport Costs and Long-Range Trade, 1300-1800: Was There a European "Transport Revolution' in the Early Modern Era?" in The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge, 1991), 228-75;
185. as well as C. Knick Harley, "Ocean Freights and Productivity, 1740-1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed," Journal of Economic History 48, no. 4 (1998): 851-76.
186. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 38, reports that merchandise exports accounted for 1 percent of world GDP in 1820;
187. Alan M. Taylor, "Globalization, Trade, and Development: Some Lessons from History," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9326 (Cambridge, 2002). 29, claims total trade measured about 2 percent of world GDP in 1800; Simon Kuznets, averaging the ratio of imports plus exports to national incomes, estimates world trade at about 2-3 percent for the early nineteenth century,
188. cited in Patrick Karl O'Brien, "Intercontinental Trade and the Development of the Third World since the Industrial Revolution," Journal of World History 8, no. 1 (1997): 75-133, 82.
189. Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley, CA, 1991);
190. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol. 2, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York, 1980), 7-9.
191. Peer Vries, "Should We Really ReOrient?" Itinerario 22, no. 3 (1998): 19-38.
192. Pomeranz shows that the Americas allowed Britain to trade out the land-intensive production of foods and raw materials for a specialization in manufacture. Unlike China's free labor peripheries, American slavery guaranteed both the flow of these resources and a market for finished goods. This unique plantation periphery and the good fortune of coal were foundational to subsequent British industrialization (Pomeranz, The Great Divergence).
193. On the emergence of modern history in the context of European relations to the wider world, Koselleck, '"Neuzeit,"' 247-53,
194. as well as Reinhart Koselleck, "The Eighteenth Century as the Beginning of Modernity," in The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford, CA, 2002), 154-69;
195. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (München, 1967-77), vol. 1, "Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben," 243-334, 256.
196. For such a contingency of categories, see, e.g., Walter Johnson, "Time and Revolution in African America: Temporality and the History of Atlantic Slavery," in Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age, 148-67.
197. Hopkins continues to echo Held et al. by suggesting the possibility that contemporary globalization is "without strong national roots" (39).
198. R. Bin Wong, "The Search for European Differences and Domination in the Early Modern World: A View from Asia," American Historical Review 107, no. 2 (2002): 447-69. Arguably, Qing practices were similar to European settler colonies, but the latter had greater economic independence from the metropole. In any case, unlike the Chinese hinterlands, they would rely on foreign trade for some time.
199. See R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca, NY, 1997), 129-35, 237.
200. Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (Cambridge, MA, 1990).
201. On Chinese expansion, Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000 (New Haven, CT, 1998), 84, 114-16, 96;
202. on defense, Geoffrey Parker, "Europe and the Wider World, 1500-1700: The Military Balance," in Tracy, The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, 161-95, 191-92.
203. Black, War and the World, 107-19;
204. David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914 (Chicago, 1990), 43-78, 13-42.
205. William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), 260-61.
206. Ernst Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, Der Historismus und seine Probleme (Tübingen, 1922), 689.
207. Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London, 1993), see esp. xxii, 92-95;
208. Frederick Cooper, "What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian's Perspective," African Affairs 100 (2001): 189-213.
209. Geyer and Bright, "Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars," 649.
210. Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 11, Nachgelassene Fragmente, 1884-1885, 580.
211. Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, "For a Unified History of the World in the Twentieth Century," Radical History Review 39 (1987): 69-91;
212. Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," American Historical Review 100, no. 4 (1995): 1034-60,
213. and "Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars." On Japanese competition with China, see Heita Kawakatsu's thesis, discussed by Wong in "The Search for European Differences" (461) (Kawakatsu Heita, "Nihon no kögyoka o meguru giatsu to Ajia ken kyösö,"
214. Geyer and Bright, "Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars," 651;
215. Bright and Geyer, "For a Unified History," 76.
216. Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital, 35-38, 42-43.
217. On the European significance of these events: Jan Romein, The Watershed of Two Eras: Europe in 1900 (Middletown, CT, 1978);
218. Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History (Harmondsworth, 1967), 153-98;
219. Bright and Geyer, "For a Unified History," 76.
220. Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New York, 1951), 69;
221. Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance; Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle (New York, 1962), 234;
222. see also William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2890-1902, 2nd ed. (New York, 1965);
223. and Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (New York, 1992), on imperial blowback.
224. Halford John Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History (1904; London, reprint 1951), 30.
225. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century," 816; similarly, Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond," 168.
226. Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, and Globalizing Capital.
227. Bairoch, Economics and World History, 5,
228. shows that tariffs had no long-term negative effect on export growth and probably contributed to the era's increasing internationalization. Important here is the short-term decline in export opportunity, and from that the appearance of a zero-sum competition that hardened national economic identities. In addition to the states cited, similar nativizing policies were instituted in Italy, though these were in its management of outflows (John C. Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State [Cambridge, 2000], 93-121;
229. Andreas Fahrmeir, "Passports and the Status of Aliens," in The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, ed. Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann [Oxford, 2001], 93-119;
230. Aristide R. Zolberg, "Global Movements, Global Walls: Responses to Migration, 1885-1925," in Global History and Migrations, ed. Wang Gungwu [Boulder, CO, 1997], 279-307;
231. Colin Holmes, "Hostile Images of Immigrants and Refugees in Nineteenth-and Twentieth-Century Britain," in Migration, Migration History, History, ed. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen [Bern, 1999], 317-34;
232. Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Great Wall against China: Responses to the First Immigration Crisis, 1885-1925," in Lucassen and Lucassen, Migration, 291-315, 315).
233. On the arms race and the start of war, David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, NJ, 1996);
234. and D. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford, 1996).
235. On resource costs, David M. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 195-231,
236. and "Globalization, Conscription, and Anti-militarism in Pre-World War I Europe," Comparative Social Research 20 (2002): 145-70.
237. For an argument that the German and Austrian military-financial complex was uniquely constricted, see Niall Ferguson, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives," Historical Journal 35, no. 3 (1992): 725-52,
238. "Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War Revisited," Past and Present 142 (1994): 141-68,
239. and The Pity of War (New York, 1999), 105-42.
240. Barraclough, Contemporary History, 116;
241. Geoffrey Barraclough, History in a Changing World (Oxford, 1957),
242. European Unity in Thought and Action (Oxford, 1963),
243. Turning Points in World History (New York, 1977),
244. and From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (New York, 1982).
245. Twentieth-century histories from the perspective of global power: Bright and Geyer, "For a Unified History," 78-88;
246. William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2001);
247. Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation (Oxford, 1997).
248. See as well Michael Geyer, "Concerning the Question: Is Imperialism a Useful Category of Historical Analysis," Radical History Review 75 (1993): 65-72.
249. Koselleck, Futures Past. On globalization discourse specifically,
250. see also Andreas Wimmer's discussion of "temporalo-centrism," in "Globalizations avant la Lettre: A Comparative View of Isomorphization and Heteromorphization in an Inter-connecting World," Comparative Studies in Society and History 43, no. 3 (2001): 435-66.
251. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, 1992).
252. Philip McMichael, "Globalization: Myths and Realities," Rural Sociology 61, no. 1 (1996): 25-55, is the strongest among the many proponents.
253. Quoted from Travis Air Force Base homepage, https://www.travis.af.mil; "Bush Links Terror Attacks to Trade Bill," New York Times, October 18, 2001, C6.