Social theory and globalization: The rise of a transnational state

Theory and Society

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 157-200

  Robinson, William I ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035535236     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1011077330455     Document Type: Article

References (181)

1. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
2. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
3. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
4. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
5. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
6. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
7. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
8. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
9. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
10. Globalization quickly became a buzzword in the 1990s and as well an essentially-contested concept, which makes its use problematic. The literature on globalization is burgeoning - too vast to reference here - although a transnational institutionality, such as I examine in this essay, remains underexplored. Neil Lazarus notes that in a 5-year period in the late 1990s, at least 50 new books and 500 new articles appeared in English with the term "globalization" prominently displayed in their titles. "Charting Globalisation," Race and Class 40/2-3 (October 1998-March 1999): 91. For basic studies, see inter alia, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 2nd edition); Race and Class, special issue: The Threat of Globalism, ibid.; James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). My conception of globalization is developed in: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robinson, "Globalisation: Nine Theses of Our Epoch," Race and Class 38/2 (1996): 13-31; Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies," Sociological Forum 3/4 (1998): 561-594; William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Toward a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class," Science and Society 64/1 (2000): 11-54; Roger Burbach and William I. Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate: Globalization as Epochal Shift," Science and Society 63/1 (1999): 10-39.
11. Istvan Meszaros, "The Uncontrollability of Globalizing Capital," Monthly Review 49/9 (February 1988): 27-37.
12. Works on the global economy are voluminous. On the globalization of production, which is of most concern here, see, inter alia, Peter Dicken, Global Shift, 3rd edition (London and New York: The Guilford Press, 1998); Jeremy Howells and Michelle Wood, The Globalisation of Production and Technology (London and New York: Belhaven Press, 1993); Burbach and Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate."
13. Works on the global economy are voluminous. On the globalization of production, which is of most concern here, see, inter alia, Peter Dicken, Global Shift, 3rd edition (London and New York: The Guilford Press, 1998); Jeremy Howells and Michelle Wood, The Globalisation of Production and Technology (London and New York: Belhaven Press, 1993); Burbach and Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate."
14. Works on the global economy are voluminous. On the globalization of production, which is of most concern here, see, inter alia, Peter Dicken, Global Shift, 3rd edition (London and New York: The Guilford Press, 1998); Jeremy Howells and Michelle Wood, The Globalisation of Production and Technology (London and New York: Belhaven Press, 1993); Burbach and Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate."
15. This is implicit in the argument of sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, the best known exponent of world-system theory, for whom the determinant distinction between core, semi-periphery, and periphery, are different forms of labor control. See Wallerstein, The Modern World System (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974).
16. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1990). Harvey argues that the transition from a Fordist to flexible regime of accumulation involves a new round of "space time compression" that is reconfiguring the factor of space. Anthony Giddens argues something similar with his notion of "space-time distanciation." See his The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
17. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1990). Harvey argues that the transition from a Fordist to flexible regime of accumulation involves a new round of "space time compression" that is reconfiguring the factor of space. Anthony Giddens argues something similar with his notion of "space-time distanciation." See his The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
18. It is not possible to develop this discussion here, but see Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms."
19. Since its implication in my argument is not necessarily apparent, I should state that the logic of capital accumulation and the dynamics of capitalist development have led to its current globalist state. Globalization is not a teleological inevitability. It is an emerging structure in motion.
20. The institutionalization of social life is a core theme in sociology. As regards the recent history and specific configurations of capitalism, the French "regulation school," the U.S. "social structure of accumulation" school, and the Amsterdam school's notion of "comprehensive concepts of control," have theorized the sets of shifting social, political, and cultural institutions that constitute "regimes of accumulation" and make possible over time the reproduction of capitalism (even though all three schools do so within a nation-state framework). See, respectively, M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: 1979); David M. Kotz, Terrence McDonough, and Michael Reich, editors, Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998). I find these schools useful to the argument that follows and their contribution to my thinking should be apparent.
21. The institutionalization of social life is a core theme in sociology. As regards the recent history and specific configurations of capitalism, the French "regulation school," the U.S. "social structure of accumulation" school, and the Amsterdam school's notion of "comprehensive concepts of control," have theorized the sets of shifting social, political, and cultural institutions that constitute "regimes of accumulation" and make possible over time the reproduction of capitalism (even though all three schools do so within a nation-state framework). See, respectively, M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: 1979); David M. Kotz, Terrence McDonough, and Michael Reich, editors, Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998). I find these schools useful to the argument that follows and their contribution to my thinking should be apparent.
22. The institutionalization of social life is a core theme in sociology. As regards the recent history and specific configurations of capitalism, the French "regulation school," the U.S. "social structure of accumulation" school, and the Amsterdam school's notion of "comprehensive concepts of control," have theorized the sets of shifting social, political, and cultural institutions that constitute "regimes of accumulation" and make possible over time the reproduction of capitalism (even though all three schools do so within a nation-state framework). See, respectively, M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: 1979); David M. Kotz, Terrence McDonough, and Michael Reich, editors, Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Kees van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998). I find these schools useful to the argument that follows and their contribution to my thinking should be apparent.
23. Robinson, "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms."
24. For this Marxist conception, see e.g., Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975); Peter Burnham, The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction (London: Macmillan, 1990).
25. For this Marxist conception, see e.g., Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975); Peter Burnham, The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction (London: Macmillan, 1990).
26. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
27. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
28. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
29. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
30. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
31. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
32. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
33. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
34. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
35. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
36. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
37. Most notable is the Gramscian school in international relations, in particular the path-breaking works of Robert Cox, who has discussed the idea that nation-states are becoming absorbed into larger international structures. But Cox's views in this particular regard are more limited than they would seem, nation-state centric and couched in the state-market and national-global dualisms discussed below. See, inter alia, Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Stephen Gill, editor, Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Political scientists from the neo-realist school such as Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane have noted that supranational institutions and "international regimes" function as political regulators of the world economy. See, inter alia, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, editors, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Stephen Krasner, editor, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Sociologists from the world system tradition along with "world polity" and related institutional approaches of John Meyers, John Boli, and their associates have investigated the growth of supranational institutional networks. See, inter alia, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, updated edition). John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," American Sociological Review, 62 (April 1997): 171-190; John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Sociological Review 103/1 (July 1997): 144-181; John Boli and George M. Thomas, World Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The "world society" school of John Burton pointed as long ago as 1972 to the constitution of society at the supranational level. John W. Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). David Held has explored the constraints on, and prospects for, a cosmopolitan democracy exercised in a supranational polity, while Craig Murphy and others have studied "global governance" structures. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
38. The term state is also used in certain circumstances - frequently in world-system and comparative-historical approaches in the social sciences - to refer to the overall territory and social system that is subject to a particular rule or domination. By this definition, the emerging world order characterized by the domination of transnational capital constitutes a transnational or global state.
39. In Economy and Society, where Weber's more detailed discussion of these issues is to be found, Weber elaborates on this dualist conception, in his notion of the checkered history of the competition and antagonism between states and capital and the rise of "an alliance of the state with capital" in the emergence of modern capitalism and the inter-state system. See Max Weber, Economy and Society, 2 volumes, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, editors, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978 [1922]), 353-354.
40. In Economy and Society, where Weber's more detailed discussion of these issues is to be found, Weber elaborates on this dualist conception, in his notion of the checkered history of the competition and antagonism between states and capital and the rise of "an alliance of the state with capital" in the emergence of modern capitalism and the inter-state system. See Max Weber, Economy and Society, 2 volumes, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, editors, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978 [1922]), 353-354.
41. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman, 1971). For more recent versions, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Saskia Sassen. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, editors, States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996); several contributions in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, editors, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State," Review of International Political Economy 4/3 (Autumn 1997): 472-496.
42. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman, 1971). For more recent versions, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Saskia Sassen. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, editors, States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996); several contributions in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, editors, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State," Review of International Political Economy 4/3 (Autumn 1997): 472-496.
43. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman, 1971). For more recent versions, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Saskia Sassen. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, editors, States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996); several contributions in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, editors, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State," Review of International Political Economy 4/3 (Autumn 1997): 472-496.
44. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman, 1971). For more recent versions, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Saskia Sassen. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, editors, States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996); several contributions in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, editors, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State," Review of International Political Economy 4/3 (Autumn 1997): 472-496.
45. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman, 1971). For more recent versions, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Saskia Sassen. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, editors, States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996); several contributions in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, editors, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State," Review of International Political Economy 4/3 (Autumn 1997): 472-496.
46. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman, 1971). For more recent versions, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Saskia Sassen. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, editors, States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996); several contributions in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, editors, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State," Review of International Political Economy 4/3 (Autumn 1997): 472-496.
47. See, inter alia, Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). The clearest statement on the "globalization as myth" view is Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). See also David Gordon's still influential essay, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations," New Left Review 168 (1988): 24-65; Mann, "Has Globalization"; A. Sivanandan and Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Globalization and Epochal Shifts: An Exchange," Monthly Review 48/9 (1997): 19-32.
48. See, inter alia, Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). The clearest statement on the "globalization as myth" view is Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). See also David Gordon's still influential essay, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations," New Left Review 168 (1988): 24-65; Mann, "Has Globalization"; A. Sivanandan and Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Globalization and Epochal Shifts: An Exchange," Monthly Review 48/9 (1997): 19-32.
49. See, inter alia, Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). The clearest statement on the "globalization as myth" view is Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). See also David Gordon's still influential essay, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations," New Left Review 168 (1988): 24-65; Mann, "Has Globalization"; A. Sivanandan and Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Globalization and Epochal Shifts: An Exchange," Monthly Review 48/9 (1997): 19-32.
50. See, inter alia, Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). The clearest statement on the "globalization as myth" view is Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). See also David Gordon's still influential essay, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations," New Left Review 168 (1988): 24-65; Mann, "Has Globalization"; A. Sivanandan and Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Globalization and Epochal Shifts: An Exchange," Monthly Review 48/9 (1997): 19-32.
51. See, inter alia, Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). The clearest statement on the "globalization as myth" view is Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). See also David Gordon's still influential essay, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations," New Left Review 168 (1988): 24-65; Mann, "Has Globalization"; A. Sivanandan and Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Globalization and Epochal Shifts: An Exchange," Monthly Review 48/9 (1997): 19-32.
52. Chase-Dunn, Global Formation.
53. A whole journal, Global Governance, is dedicated to this theme. For a call for such governance, see The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). See also: Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change; Held, Democracy in the Global Order.
54. A whole journal, Global Governance, is dedicated to this theme. For a call for such governance, see The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). See also: Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change; Held, Democracy in the Global Order.
55. A whole journal, Global Governance, is dedicated to this theme. For a call for such governance, see The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). See also: Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change; Held, Democracy in the Global Order.
56. See, e.g., Bertell Ollman, Alienation, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
57. But see, inter alia, Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Simon Clarke, editor, The State Debate (London: MacMillan, 1991); Fred Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
58. But see, inter alia, Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Simon Clarke, editor, The State Debate (London: MacMillan, 1991); Fred Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
59. But see, inter alia, Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Simon Clarke, editor, The State Debate (London: MacMillan, 1991); Fred Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
60. But see, inter alia, Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Simon Clarke, editor, The State Debate (London: MacMillan, 1991); Fred Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
61. But see, inter alia, Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Simon Clarke, editor, The State Debate (London: MacMillan, 1991); Fred Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
62. But see, inter alia, Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Simon Clarke, editor, The State Debate (London: MacMillan, 1991); Fred Block, Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
63. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, in Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 607.
64. Marx and Engels note in The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1970 [1846]): "Since the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomized, it follows that the state mediates in the formation of all common institutions and that the institutions receive a political form" (80). Marx's discussion on so-called primitive accumulation in Capital, Book VIII, highlights the role of the state in facilitating the conditions for new economic and social relations. Here I want to highlight the role of the TNS in facilitating the conditions for the new types of relations developing under globalization.
65. I would like to thank one of the Theory and Society reviewers for formulating the problematic in this manner.
66. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).
67. Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). The assertion here needs to be placed within the larger world political dimension as well. The triumph of the Soviet and Chinese revolutions and national liberation movements placed political pressure on capital that - combined with the spatial and institutional constraints -led to the class compromise.
68. On transnational classes, see inter alia, van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations; Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Becker et al., Postimperialism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "A Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
69. On transnational classes, see inter alia, van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations; Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Becker et al., Postimperialism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "A Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
70. On transnational classes, see inter alia, van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations; Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Becker et al., Postimperialism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "A Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
71. On transnational classes, see inter alia, van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations; Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Becker et al., Postimperialism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "A Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
72. On transnational classes, see inter alia, van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations; Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Becker et al., Postimperialism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "A Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
73. On transnational classes, see inter alia, van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations; Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System; Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Becker et al., Postimperialism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, "A Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
74. See, e.g., Stephen Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," International Studies Quarterly 33/4 (1989): 475-499.
75. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
76. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
77. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
78. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
79. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
80. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
81. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
82. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
83. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
84. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
85. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
86. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
87. On the crisis of Fordism/Keynesianism, the restructuring of labor, and flexible accumulation, see inter alia, Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); David Harvey, The Condition of Post-Modernity; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Ash Amin, editor, Post-Fordism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Dicken, Global Shift; K. Barber and K. Christensen, editors, Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work (New York: Putnam, 1995); Bennet Harrison, Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Michael D. Yates, Longer Hours, Fewer Jobs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994); Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (London: Verso, 1987); Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labor (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
88. Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post-Colonial World. Similarly, van der Pijl argues that there has been a historical deepening of capital's discipline over society, an extension from what Marx referred to as "formal" discipline, in the production sphere, to "real" discipline, in the reproduction sphere.
89. See, inter alia, Lydia Potts, The World Labour Market: A History of Migration (London: Zed Books, 1990).
90. McMichael, Development and Social Change.
91. As cited in Howard M. Wachtel, The Money Mandarins: The Making of a New Supranational Economic Order (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 137.
92. This point is misunderstood by those who posit a global-national dualism. Linda Weiss, e.g., asserts that "globalists have ... overstated the degree of state powerlessness" under globalization. In her construct, reified states are assumed to want to defend the interests of pluralist "citizens" of their countries. Worldwide shifts in the norm of state policy towards neo-liberal fiscal conservatism are accounted for by Weiss by "domestic pressures" in the form of citizen opposition to taxation expressed through electoral shifts (as opposed to "the power of money markets"). Weiss, "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State," New Left Review (September-October 1997): 13-20. A "plurality of special interests" in turn accounts for the "politics of redistribution," and "autonomy" and "accountability" to "national priorities" explain the "politics of growth" in Weiss's paradigm. But the trend toward worldwide fiscal conservatism has little to do with recession and government inability to raise income, since capital could always be taxed. Instead, the trend has to do with the popular classes' inability to force states to redistribute wealth. And the source of the weakening of the popular classes worldwide is precisely the restructuring of capital on a global scale.
93. For discussion, see Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Robinson and Harris, "Towards a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
94. For discussion, see Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Robinson and Harris, "Towards a Global Ruling Class?: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class."
95. See, e.g., Robinson and Harris, ibid; Burbach and Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate."
96. See, e.g., Robinson and Harris, ibid; Burbach and Robinson, "The Fin de Siecle Debate."
97. This was noted as long ago as 1974 by Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Mueller in Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974). For "from the horses' mouth" accounts of the reflexive thinking of this transnational bourgeoisie, see Walter Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming the World (New York: Scribner's, 1992). Wriston is former CEO of Citibank; Georges Soros [Geoff Shandle, editor], The Crisis of Global Capitalism: (Open Society Endangered) (1998).
98. This was noted as long ago as 1974 by Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Mueller in Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974). For "from the horses' mouth" accounts of the reflexive thinking of this transnational bourgeoisie, see Walter Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming the World (New York: Scribner's, 1992). Wriston is former CEO of Citibank; Georges Soros [Geoff Shandle, editor], The Crisis of Global Capitalism: (Open Society Endangered) (1998).
99. This was noted as long ago as 1974 by Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Mueller in Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974). For "from the horses' mouth" accounts of the reflexive thinking of this transnational bourgeoisie, see Walter Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming the World (New York: Scribner's, 1992). Wriston is former CEO of Citibank; Georges Soros [Geoff Shandle, editor], The Crisis of Global Capitalism: (Open Society Endangered) (1998).
100. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1970 [1846]), 82.
101. See Craig N. Murphy, "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy: Global Political-Economic Visions at the End of the Century," New Political Economy 4/2 (1999): 289-304, for an important discussion on the competing strategic approaches to world order among the transnational elite. Moreover, as Fred Block notes, the capitalist class is not necessarily rational in its pursuit of self-interest. See Block, Revising State Theory, 9-10.
102. See Craig N. Murphy, "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy: Global Political-Economic Visions at the End of the Century," New Political Economy 4/2 (1999): 289-304, for an important discussion on the competing strategic approaches to world order among the transnational elite. Moreover, as Fred Block notes, the capitalist class is not necessarily rational in its pursuit of self-interest. See Block, Revising State Theory, 9-10.
103. See Wachtel, The Money Mandarins, 16.
104. International bank lending jumped from $2 billion in 1972 to $90 billion in 1981, before falling to $50 billion in 1985. See Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Press, 1994), 112. On the issues in this paragraph, see also Wachtel, The Money Mandarins.
105. International bank lending jumped from $2 billion in 1972 to $90 billion in 1981, before falling to $50 billion in 1985. See Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Press, 1994), 112. On the issues in this paragraph, see also Wachtel, The Money Mandarins.
106. Strange, States and Markets, 107.
107. The former chair of Citicorp, writing in an op-ed article in The New York Times in 1992, noted that currency traders sit at 200,000 trading room monitors around the world and conduct "a kind of global plebiscite on the monetary and fiscal policies of the governments issuing currency," in which "there is no way for a nation to opt out." As reported by Jeremy Bretcher and Tim Costello, Global Village or Global Pillage?: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up (Boston: South End Press, 1994), 30.
108. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 109.
109. As cited in Wachtel, The Money Mandarins, 125.
110. Gil, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission.
111. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1959), 754-755.
112. For an earlier discussion of the gamut of international elite reports writing on the eve of globalization, see Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature," International Organization 33/2 (1979): 267-302. For an updated discussion, see Murphy, "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy."
113. For an earlier discussion of the gamut of international elite reports writing on the eve of globalization, see Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature," International Organization 33/2 (1979): 267-302. For an updated discussion, see Murphy, "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy."
114. See John Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington consensus,'" World Development 21/8 (1993): 1329-1336.
115. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 170.
116. For one sophisticated analysis of the NAFTA and on free trade agreements in the context of the transnationalization of the state, see Leo Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State," in James H. Mittelman, editor, Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996): 83-116.
117. Susan George, A Fate Worse than Debt: The World Financial Crisis and the Poor (New York: Grove Press, 1988), 33.
118. See McMichael, Development and Social Change, 159. In 1983, World Bank president A. W. Clausen remarked: "The fundamental philosophy of our institution is to help countries diversify their exports . . . and to have an export orientation." Cited in ibid.
119. Address by UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan at the WEF, Davos, Switzerland, 31 January 1998, reprinted in part as a paid advertisement by the Pfizer Corporation in The Economist, March 28-April 3, 1998, 24.
120. See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992); Dicken, Global Shift.
121. See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992); Dicken, Global Shift.
122. Cited in Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge, 1996). But perhaps the more important thing to note is that the structural power of transnational capital allows it to exercise economic coercion in a way hitherto unseen, and to, in part, supplant the earlier forms of direct or extra-economic coercion such as military force by colonial states and imperialist intervention, in the drive to shape and reproduce the dominant social structures and practices.
123. Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
124. David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," in Marvin E. Olsen and Martin N. Marger, editors, Power in Modern Societies (Boulder: Westview, 1993). The original is in emphasis from "The extent . . ." to ". . . historically contingent."
125. See, inter alia, G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, 3rd edition (Mountain View: Mayfield, 1998); Thomas T. Dye, Who's Running America? 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall: 1986); Michael Useem, The Inner Circle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).
126. See, inter alia, G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, 3rd edition (Mountain View: Mayfield, 1998); Thomas T. Dye, Who's Running America? 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall: 1986); Michael Useem, The Inner Circle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).
127. See, inter alia, G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, 3rd edition (Mountain View: Mayfield, 1998); Thomas T. Dye, Who's Running America? 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall: 1986); Michael Useem, The Inner Circle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).
128. See, inter alia, G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, 3rd edition (Mountain View: Mayfield, 1998); Thomas T. Dye, Who's Running America? 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall: 1986); Michael Useem, The Inner Circle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).
129. See, e.g., Albert Fishlow, Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Richard R. Fagen, and Roger D. Hansen, Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978); Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order"; Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus.'"
130. See, e.g., Albert Fishlow, Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Richard R. Fagen, and Roger D. Hansen, Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978); Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order"; Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus.'"
131. See, e.g., Albert Fishlow, Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Richard R. Fagen, and Roger D. Hansen, Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978); Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order"; Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus.'"
132. Susan George, The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All (Boulder: Westview, 1992), xvi.
133. On this neo-liberal restructuring around the world, see, inter alia, Henk Overbeek, editor, Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s (London: Routledge, 1993). See also Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. An excellent account of the process as it has applied to Latin America is Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economies in Latin America (London: Cassell/Latin America Bureau, 1995). On Africa, see Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, and Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1989). On the social effects of restructuring, see Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reform (London: Zed, 1997).
134. On this neo-liberal restructuring around the world, see, inter alia, Henk Overbeek, editor, Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s (London: Routledge, 1993). See also Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. An excellent account of the process as it has applied to Latin America is Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economies in Latin America (London: Cassell/Latin America Bureau, 1995). On Africa, see Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, and Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1989). On the social effects of restructuring, see Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reform (London: Zed, 1997).
135. On this neo-liberal restructuring around the world, see, inter alia, Henk Overbeek, editor, Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s (London: Routledge, 1993). See also Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. An excellent account of the process as it has applied to Latin America is Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economies in Latin America (London: Cassell/Latin America Bureau, 1995). On Africa, see Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, and Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1989). On the social effects of restructuring, see Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reform (London: Zed, 1997).
136. On this neo-liberal restructuring around the world, see, inter alia, Henk Overbeek, editor, Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s (London: Routledge, 1993). See also Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. An excellent account of the process as it has applied to Latin America is Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economies in Latin America (London: Cassell/Latin America Bureau, 1995). On Africa, see Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, and Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1989). On the social effects of restructuring, see Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reform (London: Zed, 1997).
137. On this neo-liberal restructuring around the world, see, inter alia, Henk Overbeek, editor, Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo-Liberalism in the 1980s (London: Routledge, 1993). See also Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. An excellent account of the process as it has applied to Latin America is Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise of Market Economies in Latin America (London: Cassell/Latin America Bureau, 1995). On Africa, see Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, and Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1989). On the social effects of restructuring, see Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reform (London: Zed, 1997).
138. Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," New German Critique, 6 (1975): 139-147. For theoretical discussion on the contradictory role of the state in simultaneously reproducing yet negating commodity relations, see Boris Frankel, "On the State of the State: Marxist Theories of the State After Leninism," Theory and Society 7 (1979): 205-227 . Pressures are generated from capital for privatization. These pressures, I maintain, became quite effective in the 1980s and 1990s due to the enhanced structural and direct power of transnational capital as a result of globalization.
139. Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," New German Critique, 6 (1975): 139-147. For theoretical discussion on the contradictory role of the state in simultaneously reproducing yet negating commodity relations, see Boris Frankel, "On the State of the State: Marxist Theories of the State After Leninism," Theory and Society 7 (1979): 205-227 . Pressures are generated from capital for privatization. These pressures, I maintain, became quite effective in the 1980s and 1990s due to the enhanced structural and direct power of transnational capital as a result of globalization.
140. See, e.g., Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty.
141. This often took place through the political reorganization of peripheral states effected during "transitions to democracy." For detailed discussion on this point, see Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy.
142. See, e.g., The Economist, "The Central Bank as God," November 14, 1998: 23-25.
143. World Bank, The State in a Changing World (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), 152.
144. On the rise of the technocrats in Latin America, see Jorge I. Dominguez, editor, Technopols (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
145. McMichael, Development and Social Change, 141.
146. McMichael, Development and Social Change, 111.
147. McMichael, Development and Social Change, 149, 159.
148. On this point, see William I. Robinson, "Latin America and Global Capitalism," Race and Class 40/2-3 (1998/1999): 111-131. James O'Connor (1994: 166) notes that the state provides capital with access to labor power, nature, and infrastructure. The point here is that the TNS does precisely this for transnational capital at a global level.
149. See, inter alia, Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation State (St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1996).
150. See, inter alia, Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation State (St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1996).
151. The World Bank, in its 1997 World Development Report, titled The State in a Changing World (Washington, D.C.: World Bank), was a virtual blueprint for the transformation of national states along these lines.
152. The State in a Changing World (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), 12. For two analyses of this seminal report, see Craig N. Murphy, "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy"; Leo Panitch, "'The State in a Changing World': Social-Democratizing Global Capitalism?" Monthly Review 50/5 (October 1988): 11-22. According to the report, national states must play an active role as "partner, catalyst, facilitator" of globalization (p. 12), and that it is essential for them to maintain "liberal trade, capital markets and investment regimes" (p. 17).
153. The State in a Changing World (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), 12. For two analyses of this seminal report, see Craig N. Murphy, "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy"; Leo Panitch, "'The State in a Changing World': Social-Democratizing Global Capitalism?" Monthly Review 50/5 (October 1988): 11-22. According to the report, national states must play an active role as "partner, catalyst, facilitator" of globalization (p. 12), and that it is essential for them to maintain "liberal trade, capital markets and investment regimes" (p. 17).
154. The State in a Changing World (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), 12. For two analyses of this seminal report, see Craig N. Murphy, "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy"; Leo Panitch, "'The State in a Changing World': Social-Democratizing Global Capitalism?" Monthly Review 50/5 (October 1988): 11-22. According to the report, national states must play an active role as "partner, catalyst, facilitator" of globalization (p. 12), and that it is essential for them to maintain "liberal trade, capital markets and investment regimes" (p. 17).
155. In 1994, a group called the Bretton Woods Commission, headed by former U.S. Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker, himself a key figure in globalization, called for an overhaul of the world monetary system, with an enhanced disciplinary role for the IMF in all countries, including the United States. In June 1995, the G-7 took the endeavor further, drafting strategies to transnationalize efforts to stabilize the world monetary system, including the creation of a worldwide emergency fund to bail out countries on the verge of bankruptcy and deeper financial surveillance of national states and the system at large. See McMichael, Development and Social Change, 174-175. For the slew of proposals for achieved centralized global financial regulation, see Business Week, October 12, 1998, "Special Report: How to Reshape the World Financial System," 113-116; The Economist, January 30, 1999, Special Supplement: "A Survey of Global Finance: Time for a Redesign." Murphy, reviewing other reports released in 1997 by transnational organizations, predicted that a "Third Way" ideology as epitomized by Clinton and Blair would become hegemonic in the face of the intractable problems and the legitimacy crisis of neo-liberalism. This ideology, however, would not question the premises of an ever more open and integrated global economy. "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy."
156. In 1994, a group called the Bretton Woods Commission, headed by former U.S. Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker, himself a key figure in globalization, called for an overhaul of the world monetary system, with an enhanced disciplinary role for the IMF in all countries, including the United States. In June 1995, the G-7 took the endeavor further, drafting strategies to transnationalize efforts to stabilize the world monetary system, including the creation of a worldwide emergency fund to bail out countries on the verge of bankruptcy and deeper financial surveillance of national states and the system at large. See McMichael, Development and Social Change, 174-175. For the slew of proposals for achieved centralized global financial regulation, see Business Week, October 12, 1998, "Special Report: How to Reshape the World Financial System," 113-116; The Economist, January 30, 1999, Special Supplement: "A Survey of Global Finance: Time for a Redesign." Murphy, reviewing other reports released in 1997 by transnational organizations, predicted that a "Third Way" ideology as epitomized by Clinton and Blair would become hegemonic in the face of the intractable problems and the legitimacy crisis of neo-liberalism. This ideology, however, would not question the premises of an ever more open and integrated global economy. "Inequality, Turmoil, and Democracy."
157. In 1994, a group called the Bretton Woods Commission, headed by former U.S. Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker, himself a key figure in globalization, called for an overhaul of the world monetary system, with an enhanced disciplinary role for the IMF in all countries, including the United States. In June 1995, the G-7 took the endeavor further, drafting strategies to transnationalize efforts to stabilize the world monetary system, including the creation of a worldwide emergency fund to bail out countries on the verge of bankruptcy and deeper financial surveillance of national states and the system at large. See McMichael, Development and Social Change, 174-175. For the slew of proposals for achieved centralized global financial regulation, see Business Week, October 12, 1998, "Special Report: How to Reshape the World Financial System," 113-116; The Economist, January 30, 1999, Special Supplement: "A Survey of Global Finance: Time for a Redesign." Murphy, reviewing
158. Joseph K. Roberts, "Multilateral Agreement on Investment," Monthly Review 50/5 (October 1998): 23-32 (citation on p. 26). See also James Davis and Cheryl Bishop, "The MAI: Multilaterialism from Above," Race and Class 40/2 (October 1998-March 1999): 159-170.
159. Joseph K. Roberts, "Multilateral Agreement on Investment," Monthly Review 50/5 (October 1998): 23-32 (citation on p. 26). See also James Davis and Cheryl Bishop, "The MAI: Multilaterialism from Above," Race and Class 40/2 (October 1998-March 1999): 159-170.
160. Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 13.
161. See, inter alia: Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), "The Capitalist State - Reply to Poulantzas," New Left Review 59 (1970), "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," New Left Review 82 (1973); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review 58 (1969), "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review 95 (1976).
162. See, inter alia: Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), "The Capitalist State - Reply to Poulantzas," New Left Review 59 (1970), "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," New Left Review 82 (1973); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review 58 (1969), "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review 95 (1976).
163. See, inter alia: Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), "The Capitalist State - Reply to Poulantzas," New Left Review 59 (1970), "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," New Left Review 82 (1973); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review 58 (1969), "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review 95 (1976).
164. See, inter alia: Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), "The Capitalist State - Reply to Poulantzas," New Left Review 59 (1970), "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," New Left Review 82 (1973); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review 58 (1969), "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review 95 (1976).
165. See, inter alia: Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), "The Capitalist State - Reply to Poulantzas," New Left Review 59 (1970), "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," New Left Review 82 (1973); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review 58 (1969), "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review 95 (1976).
166. See, inter alia: Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), "The Capitalist State - Reply to Poulantzas," New Left Review 59 (1970), "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," New Left Review 82 (1973); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), "The Problem of the Capitalist State," New Left Review 58 (1969), "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau," New Left Review 95 (1976).
167. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
168. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
169. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
170. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
171. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
172. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
173. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
174. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
175. See, inter alia, Fred Block, Revising State Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martins, 1973); Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1987); Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," in L. Lindberg et al., editors, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington: D. H. Heath, 1975); Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Deitrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
176. Richard Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson, editors, States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
177. Richard Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson, editors, States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
178. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Robert C. Tucker, editor, The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, 1978), 482.
179. See, e.g., Christopher Chase-Dunn and Terry Boswell, "Post-Communism and the Global Commonwealth," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 24/1-2 (1999): 195-219.
180. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12.
181. For discussion, see Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy.