The myth of a 'global' economy: Enduring national foundations and emerging regional realities

New Political Economy

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 157-184

  Zysman, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GLOBALISATION; GROWTH MODEL; NATIONAL ORIGIN; POLITICAL ECONOMY; REGIONAL PATTERN; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0030468399     PISSN: 13563467     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13563469608406251     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (Basic Books, 1975).
2. See, among other work, John Zysman & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, American Industry in International Competition (Cornell University Press, 1983); and Michael Dertouzos et al. Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge (MIT Press, 1989).
3. See, among other work, John Zysman & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, American Industry in International Competition (Cornell University Press, 1983); and Michael Dertouzos et al. Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge (MIT Press, 1989).
4. This case was built in Globalization and Production, BRIE Working Paper No. 45, Berkeley, CA, 1991. Some of the language in this paragraph is taken from this monograph, of which I was co-author.
5. Ibid.
6. John Stopford and Susan Strange are among those who have reached similar conclusions.
7. François Bar, Michael Borrus & Richard Steinberg, Islands in the Bit-Stream: Charting the NII Interoperability Debate, BRIE Working Paper No. 79, Berkeley, CA, 1995.
8. In 1987 Japan alone accounted for 12.4 per cent of global GDP, and Japan plus the East Asian NICs accounted for 15.8 per cent. (These figures are based on data in Bureau d'Information et Prevision Economique, Europe in 1992 (BIPE, 1987).) See also Takashi Inoguchi, 'Shaping and Sharing Pacific Dynamism', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 505 (1989).
9. Gerard Lafay & Colette Herzog, with Loukas Stemitsiotis and Deniz Unal, Commerce International: La Fin des Avantages Acquis (Economica, 1989).
10. Barry Eichengreen & Jeffrey Frankel, 'Economic regionalism: evidence from two 20th century episodes,' paper presented at the East-West Center Conference, Globalization and Regionalization, Honolulu, 11 August 1994.
11. 'Foreign direct investment in East Asia,' paper prepared by Sylvia Ostry for a joint research project conducted by the Center for International Studies, University of Toronto, and the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 1992.
12. Ibid.
13. See, for example, 'Everybody's favorite monsters', The Economist, 27 March 1993.
14. Ibid.
15. Eichengreen & Frankel, 'Economic regionalism'.
16. Jeffrey Frankel & Miles Kahler (Eds), Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia (University of Chicago Press, 1993). See section 1 and the work of Jeffrey Frankel in particular. Frankel is not contending that Asian trade has not increased, but rather that it has not increased faster than growth and proximity would predict. Frankel's aggregation of imports and exports makes it impossible to consider the internal structure of trade, which is one of the significant pieces of the story.
17. The clear reorientation that followed Britain's belated membership demonstrates clearly the economic consequences of the political bargain. The fundamental bargains of the European Community were recast in the late 1980s. The recasting came in response to the shifting positions of the USA and Japan, which sharply altered European choices, as well as the severe political problems of slow growth and high unemployment that forced political leaders of the left and right to seek new strategies for economic development. Europe's Single Market Act relaunched the European project. In the last few years another redefinition of the political character of the Community has been forced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need economically and politically to re-attach Central Europe to the West, and the reunification of Germany. The stories of creating the Single Market and the Maastricht Treaty have become intertangled, but they have separate logics and origins. See Wayne Sandholtz & John Zysman, 'Recasting the European bargain', in: Wayne Sandholtz, Michael Borrus, John Zysman, Ken Conca, Jay Stowsky, Steven Vogel & Steve Weber, The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System (Oxford University Press, 1992).
18. 'The Rising Tide: Japan in Asia,' special supplement of Japan Economic Journal (1990), p. 4. See also Inoguchi, 'Shaping and Sharing Pacific Dynamism'.
19. 'The Rising Tide: Japan in Asia,' special supplement of Japan Economic Journal (1990), p. 4. See also Inoguchi, 'Shaping and Sharing Pacific Dynamism'.
20. Ibid., p. 7.
21. 'Asian surpluses imperil trade, World Bank says', International Herald Tribune, 14 July 1994, p. 13.
22. John Zysman & Michael Borrus, 'Lines of fracture, webs of cohesion: economic interconnection and security politics in Asia', paper presented at the IGCC Conference on Links between Economic and Security Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region, May 1993.
23. This analysis is taken from John Zysman & Eileen Doherty, 'The evolving role of the state in Asian industrialization', paper presented at the 11th Annual EDI/FASID Joint Seminar, Regulatory and Institutional Aspects of the East Asian Models, Hakone, 1994.
24. Michael Borrus, 'Left for dead: Asian production networks and the rivival of US electronics', BRIE draft, 1996.
25. Kiichiro Fukasaku, 'Economic regionalisation and intra-industry trade: Pacific Asian perspectives', paper presented to the OECD Development Centre, Paris, 10 June 1991. The paper cites the Asian Development Bank Outlook of 1990.
26. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Harvard University Press, 1962).
27. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Beacon Press, 1966). The particular phrasing is a restatement of the opening paragraph of the preface. Moore's long battle with Talcott Parsons is well known and quite evident in the concluding appendix of the book.
28. Steven K. Vogel, 'The Bureaucratic Approach to the Financial Revolution: Japan's Ministry of Finance and Financial System and Reform, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1994). Also Steven K. Vogel, Changing the Rules: The Politics of Regulatory Reform in the Advanced Industrial Countries, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1993.
29. Steven K. Vogel, 'The Bureaucratic Approach to the Financial Revolution: Japan's Ministry of Finance and Financial System and Reform, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1994). Also Steven K. Vogel, Changing the Rules: The Politics of Regulatory Reform in the Advanced Industrial Countries, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1993.
30. Suzanne Berger has made a similar point in Convergence and Diversity?: National Models of Production and Distribution in a Global Economy (Industrial Performance Center, Cambridge, MIT, 1994).
31. P. Patel & K. Pavitt, 'The Innovative Performance of the World's Largest Firms: Some New Evidence', The Journal of Economics and New Technology, Vol. 2 (1992), pp. 91-102.
32. Daniele Archibugi & Jonathan Michie, The Globalisation of Technology: Myths and Realities, University of Cambridge Research Papers in Management Studies 1992-1993 (No. 14), 1993.
33. Paolo Guerrieri, Technology and International Trade Performance in the Most Advanced Countries, BRIE Working Paper No. 49, Berkeley, CA, 1991; Paolo Guerrieri & Carlo Milana, Technological and Trade Competition in High-Tech Products, BRIE Working Paper No. 54 Berkeley, CA, 1991; Giovanni Dosi, Keith Pavitt & Luc Soete, The Economics of Technological Change and International Trade (Harvester Wheatsheaf and New York University Press, 1990).
34. Paolo Guerrieri, Technology and International Trade Performance in the Most Advanced Countries, BRIE Working Paper No. 49, Berkeley, CA, 1991; Paolo Guerrieri & Carlo Milana, Technological and Trade Competition in High-Tech Products, BRIE Working Paper No. 54 Berkeley, CA, 1991; Giovanni Dosi, Keith Pavitt & Luc Soete, The Economics of Technological Change and International Trade (Harvester Wheatsheaf and New York University Press, 1990).
35. Paolo Guerrieri, Technology and International Trade Performance in the Most Advanced Countries, BRIE Working Paper No. 49, Berkeley, CA, 1991; Paolo Guerrieri & Carlo Milana, Technological and Trade Competition in High-Tech Products, BRIE Working Paper No. 54 Berkeley, CA, 1991; Giovanni Dosi, Keith Pavitt & Luc Soete, The Economics of Technological Change and International Trade (Harvester Wheatsheaf and New York University Press, 1990).
36. Patel & Pavitt, 'The Innovative Performance of the World's Largest Firms'.
37. For a full development of this argument, see John Zysman, 'How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth', Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1994).
38. Michael Borrus, 'The regional architecture of global electronics: trajectories, linkages and access to technology', in: Peter Gourevitch & Paolo Guerrieri (Eds), New Challenges to International Cooperation: Adjustment of Firms, Policies, and Organizations to Global Competition (University of California, 1993); Erik Dahment, 'Development Blocs in Industrial Economics', Scandinavian Economics Review, Vol. 1 (1988).
39. Michael Borrus, 'The regional architecture of global electronics: trajectories, linkages and access to technology', in: Peter Gourevitch & Paolo Guerrieri (Eds), New Challenges to International Cooperation: Adjustment of Firms, Policies, and Organizations to Global Competition (University of California, 1993); Erik Dahment, 'Development Blocs in Industrial Economics', Scandinavian Economics Review, Vol. 1 (1988).
40. William Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the Automobile Industry (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
41. Borrus, 'The regional architecture of global electronics'.
42. Ibid.
43. Institutional structures as a line of argument is developed in a number of places. I have built my version of that argument in Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France (University of California Press, 1977); Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Finance and the Politics of Industrial Change (Cornell University Press, 1983); and Zysman, 'How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth'. My approach has focused initially on policy continuities. The notion that these policy continuities generate market logics that drive firm behaviour is developed in Zysman & Tyson, American Industry in International Competition. Frameworks of constraints and incentives, as presented by David Soskice, translate these historical arguments into the language of microeconomics and hence directly into the perspective of the firm. They act as an invaluable intermediary between policy arguments and market logic arguments. The bulk of Soskice's work is on labour market political economy. A part now concerns technology developments. David Soskice, Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross Country Differences, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, July 1993.
44. Institutional structures as a line of argument is developed in a number of places. I have built my version of that argument in Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France (University of California Press, 1977); Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Finance and the Politics of Industrial Change (Cornell University Press, 1983); and Zysman, 'How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth'. My approach has focused initially on policy continuities. The notion that these policy continuities generate market logics that drive firm behaviour is developed in Zysman & Tyson, American Industry in International Competition. Frameworks of constraints and incentives, as presented by David Soskice, translate these historical arguments into the language of microeconomics and hence directly into the perspective of the firm. They act as an invaluable intermediary between policy arguments and market logic arguments. The bulk of Soskice's work is on labour market political economy. A part now concerns technology developments. David Soskice, Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross Country Differences, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, July 1993.
45. Institutional structures as a line of argument is developed in a number of places. I have built my version of that argument in Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France (University of California Press, 1977); Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Finance and the Politics of Industrial Change (Cornell University Press, 1983); and Zysman, 'How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth'. My approach has focused initially on policy continuities. The notion that these policy continuities generate market logics that drive firm behaviour is developed in Zysman & Tyson, American Industry in International Competition. Frameworks of constraints and incentives, as presented by David Soskice, translate these historical arguments into the language of microeconomics and hence directly into the perspective of the firm. They act as an invaluable intermediary between policy arguments and market logic arguments. The bulk of Soskice's work is on labour market political economy. A part now concerns technology developments. David Soskice, Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross Country Differences, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, July 1993.
46. Institutional structures as a line of argument is developed in a number of places. I have built my version of that argument in Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France (University of California Press, 1977); Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Finance and the Politics of Industrial Change (Cornell University Press, 1983); and Zysman, 'How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth'. My approach has focused initially on policy continuities. The notion that these policy continuities generate market logics that drive firm behaviour is developed in Zysman & Tyson, American Industry in International Competition. Frameworks of constraints and incentives, as presented by David Soskice, translate these historical arguments into the language of microeconomics and hence directly into the perspective of the firm. They act as an invaluable intermediary between policy arguments and market logic arguments. The bulk of Soskice's work is on labour market political economy. A part now concerns technology developments. David Soskice, Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross Country Differences, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, July 1993.
47. Institutional structures as a line of argument is developed in a number of places. I have built my version of that argument in Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France (University of California Press, 1977); Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Finance and the Politics of Industrial Change (Cornell University Press, 1983); and Zysman, 'How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth'. My approach has focused initially on policy continuities. The notion that these policy continuities generate market logics that drive firm behaviour is developed in Zysman & Tyson, American Industry in International Competition. Frameworks of constraints and incentives, as presented by David Soskice, translate these historical arguments into the language of microeconomics and hence directly into the perspective of the firm. They act as an invaluable intermediary between policy arguments and market logic arguments. The bulk of Soskice's work is on labour market political economy. A part now concerns technology developments. David Soskice, Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross Country Differences, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, July 1993.
48. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 'Financial Markets and Development', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 5, No 4 (1989) & Richard Nelson (Ed.), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 1993).
49. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 'Financial Markets and Development', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 5, No 4 (1989) & Richard Nelson (Ed.), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 1993).
50. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth; and Soskice, Innovation Strategies of Companies.
51. Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order, and Chalmers Johnson, Laura D'Andrea Tyson & John Zysman (Eds), Politics and Productivity: The Real Story of Why Japan Works (Ballinger, 1989).
52. Zysman, Political Strategies for Industrial Order, and Chalmers Johnson, Laura D'Andrea Tyson & John Zysman (Eds), Politics and Productivity: The Real Story of Why Japan Works (Ballinger, 1989).
53. Soskice, Innovation Strategies of Companies.
54. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth.
55. Giangiacomo Nardozzi, 'National specificities and current tendencies in financial systems', in: Vera Zamagni (Ed.), Finance and the Enterprise (Academic Press, 1992), p. 254. For the alternate analytic perspective, see T.M. Rybczinski, 'Industrial Finance Systems in Europe, US and Japan', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, No. 5 (1984), pp. 276-80; and The Internationalization of the Financial System and the Developing Countries: The Evolving Relationship, World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 788, Washington DC, 1986.
56. Giangiacomo Nardozzi, 'National specificities and current tendencies in financial systems', in: Vera Zamagni (Ed.), Finance and the Enterprise (Academic Press, 1992), p. 254. For the alternate analytic perspective, see T.M. Rybczinski, 'Industrial Finance Systems in Europe, US and Japan', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, No. 5 (1984), pp. 276-80; and The Internationalization of the Financial System and the Developing Countries: The Evolving Relationship, World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 788, Washington DC, 1986.
57. Giangiacomo Nardozzi, 'National specificities and current tendencies in financial systems', in: Vera Zamagni (Ed.), Finance and the Enterprise (Academic Press, 1992), p. 254. For the alternate analytic perspective, see T.M. Rybczinski, 'Industrial Finance Systems in Europe, US and Japan', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, No. 5 (1984), pp. 276-80; and The Internationalization of the Financial System and the Developing Countries: The Evolving Relationship, World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 788, Washington DC, 1986.
58. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth.
59. Richard O'Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography (The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Pinter Publishers, 1992).
60. Nardozzi, 'National specificities and current tendencies in financial systems', p. 262.
61. Giuseppe Conti, 'Alternative financial systems in industrial economies', in: Zamagni (Ed.), Finance and the Enterprise, p. 208.
62. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth.
63. Sofia A. Perez, 'From cheap credit to the EMS: economic policy strategy and financial regulation in France and Spain', paper given at the Workshop on Financial Institutions and Regulatory Regimes in Europe from the 1930s to the 1980s, Centre for European Studies, Harvard University, January 1992; and Michael Maurice Loriaux, France After Hegemony: International Change and Financial Reform (Cornell University Press, 1991).
64. Sofia A. Perez, 'From cheap credit to the EMS: economic policy strategy and financial regulation in France and Spain', paper given at the Workshop on Financial Institutions and Regulatory Regimes in Europe from the 1930s to the 1980s, Centre for European Studies, Harvard University, January 1992; and Michael Maurice Loriaux, France After Hegemony: International Change and Financial Reform (Cornell University Press, 1991).
65. Ethan B. Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy (Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 2 (emphasis in the italics are original).
66. Personal communication with Lewis W. Coleman, former Vice-Chairman, Bank of America, currently Senior Managing Director and Co-Director of Investment Banking, Montgomery Securities.
67. Steve K. Vogel, Freer Markets More Rules: The Paradoxical Politics, of Regulatory Reform (University of California, Irvine, 1994).
68. Geoffrey Garret, 'Trade, capital mobility and the politics of economic policy', mimeo, Stanford University, 1994.
69. Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 (Oxford University Press, 1992).
70. Vogel, Freer Markets More Rules.
71. Ibid., p. 236.
72. Ibid., p. 244.
73. Multinationals and the US Technology Base, Final Report of the Multinationals Project, Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, 1994.
74. Ibid.
75. Zysman & Doherty, 'The evolving role of the state in Asian industrialization'.
76. Multinationals and the US Technology Base.
77. Joseph Stiglitz's excellent work on finance is one example. A particularly lucid non-mathematical presentation is 'Financial Markets and Development'. See also David Soskice, Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System (Oxford University Press, 1992).
78. Joseph Stiglitz's excellent work on finance is one example. A particularly lucid non-mathematical presentation is 'Financial Markets and Development'. See also David Soskice, Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System (Oxford University Press, 1992).
79. See Alexis de Tocqueville's classic argument in The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Doubleday, 1955) and Reinhard Bendix's explication of it in Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing World (Wiley, 1964).
80. See Alexis de Tocqueville's classic argument in The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Doubleday, 1955) and Reinhard Bendix's explication of it in Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing World (Wiley, 1964).
81. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.
82. Peter Cowhey & Jonathan Aronson, Managing the World Economy: The Consequences of Corporate Alliances (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).