Lobbying bureaucrats

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 108, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 643-668

  Bennedsen, Morten ^a   Feldmann, Sven E ^b  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Delegation; Divided government; Interest group influence; Political institutions

Indexed keywords

BUREAUCRACY; DECISION MAKING; LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION;

EID: 33845958284     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00473.x     Document Type: Article

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