Transparency and reputation: The publication of central bank forecasts

Topics in Macroeconomics

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2005, Pages

  Geraats, Petra M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244505028     PISSN: 15345998     EISSN: 15345998     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5998.1277     Document Type: Review

References (32)

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