Cryptographically sound security proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4189 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 362-383

  Backes, M ^a   Cervesato, I ^b   Jaggard, A D ^c   Scedrov, A ^d   Tsay, J K ^d  

^a SAARLAND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b Deductive Solutions   (United States)

^c TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; COPYRIGHTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SECURITY SYSTEMS;

COMPUTATIONAL MODELS; PUBLIC-KEY AUTHENTICATION;

PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 33750226088     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11863908_23     Document Type: Conference Paper

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