Undescribable events

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 73, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 849-868

  Al Najjar, Nabil I ^a   Anderlini, Luca ^b   Felli, Leonardo ^c  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; MODELING; PROBABILITY;

EID: 33749060047     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00399.x     Document Type: Article

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