Incomplete contracts and complexity costs

Theory and Decision

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 23-50

  Anderlini, Luca ^b   Felli, Leonardo ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b Faculty of Economics and Politics   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Complexity measures; Computability; Incomplete contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042264172     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004917722235     Document Type: Article

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