Ambivalent investment and the hold-up problem

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 4, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 1148-1164

  Reiche, Sönje ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749051372     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/JEEA.2006.4.6.1148     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton (1992). "An 'Incomplete Contract' Approach to Financial Contracting." Review of Economic Studies, 59, 473-494.
2. Aghion, Philippe, Matthias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994). "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information." Econometrica, 62(2), 257-282.
3. Che, Yeon-Koo, and Donald B. Hausch (1999). "Cooperative Investment and the Value of Contracting." American Economic Review, 89(1), 125-147.
4. Dewatripont, Matthias, and Jean Tirole (1994). "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1027-1054.
5. Garicano, Luis, and Tano Santos (2004). "Referrals." American Economic Review, 94(3), 499-525.
6. Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1988). "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation." Econometrica, 56, 755-785.
7. Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1999). "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts." Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 115-138.
8. Lyon, Thomas P., and Eric Rasmusen (2004). "Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 20(1), 148-169.
9. Maskin, Eric (1999). "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality." Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 23-38.
10. Maskin, Eric, and John Moore (1999). "Implementation and Renegotiation." Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 39-56.
11. Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole (1999). "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracting." Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 93-114.
12. Moore, John (1992). "Implementation in Environments with Complete Information." In Advances in Economic Theory, edited by Jean-Jacques Laffont. Cambridge University Press.
13. Nöldeke, Georg, and Klaus Schmidt (1995). "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem." Rand Journal of Economics, 26(2), 163-179.
14. Segal, Ilya (1999). "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation of Incomplete Contracts." Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 39-56.
15. Segal, Ilya, and Michael D. Whinston (2002). "The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing)." Econometrica, 70(1), 1-45.
16. Watson, Joel (2005). "Contract, Mechanism Design and Technological Detail." Working paper, University of California, San Diego.