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Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 284-303

Auctions for government securities: A laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs

Author keywords

Common values; Discriminatory auctions; Experimental economics; Multi unit demand; Spanish auctions; Treasury; Uniform auctions

Indexed keywords


EID: 33748974271     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.12.007     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (15)

References (40)
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