Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 63-104

  Nyborg, Kjell G ^a   Sundaresan, Suresh ^b  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Markups; Short squeeze; Strategic behavior; When issued markets; Winner's curse

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030243415     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(95)00871-B     Document Type: Article

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