Braess's Paradox in large random graph

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 296-305

  Valiant, Greg ^a   Roughgardent, Tim ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Braess's Paradox; Random graphs; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

BRAESS'S PARADOX; RANDOM GRAPHS; SELFISH ROUTING;

MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY; RANDOM PROCESSES;

GRAPH THEORY;

EID: 33748702879     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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