Implementation with a bounded action space

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 62-71

  Blumrosen, Liad ^a   Feldman, Michal ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Communication Complexity; Implementation; Mechansm Design; Single Crossing Condition

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; COSTS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; GAME THEORY;

COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY; IMPLEMENTATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; SINGLE-CROSSING CONDITION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33748676437     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134715     Document Type: Conference Paper

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