Auctions with severely bounded communication

Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings

Volumn , Issue , 2002, Pages 406-415

  Blumrosen, Liad ^a   Nisan, Noam ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); DATA COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; GAME THEORY; HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION; INTERNET; OPTIMIZATION; TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS; THEOREM PROVING;

AUCTIONS; DISTRIBUTED INCENTIVE COMPUTER SYSTEMS; INFORMATION TRANSMISSION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0036953620     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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