A study of limited-precision, incremental elicitation in auctions: Extended abstract

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 3, Issue , 2004, Pages 1344-1345

  Kress, Alexander ^a   Boutilier, Craig ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS; NEGOTIATION CHANNELS; ONE-SHOT AUCTIONS; ONLINE NEGOTIATION;

CHANNEL CAPACITY; COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER NETWORKS; COST ACCOUNTING; ONLINE SYSTEMS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SOFTWARE AGENTS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 4544365156     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (5)

1. L. Blumrosen and N. Nisan. Auctions with severely bounded communication. In Proc. of FOCS 02, Vancouver, Canada, 406-416, 2002.
2. L. Blumrosen, N. Nisan, and I. Segal. Multi-player and multi-round auctions with severely bounded communication. In Proc. of ESA 03, Budapest, Hungary, 2003.
3. A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
4. D. C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. to appear.
5. T. Sandholm and A. Gilpin. Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. In Proc. of AMEC V Workshop, Melbourne, 2003.