Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 242-243

  Leonardi, Stefane ^a   Schäfer, Guido ^b  

^a SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATICS   (Germany)

Author keywords

Connected facility location; Cost sharing; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPETITION; COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN; COMPUTER NETWORKS; COSTS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

CONNECTED FACILITY LOCATION; COST SHARING; MECHANISM DESIGN;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 3242795028     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988814     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (6)

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