Sequential elections and overlapping terms: Voting for US Senate

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 97-108

  Heckelman, Jac C ^a  

^a WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D72; Divided government; H11; Median voter model; Primary elections

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042852230     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00076-7     Document Type: Article

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