Early round upsets and championship blowouts

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 316-329

  Harbaugh, Rick ^a   Klumpp, Tilman ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24144469185     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbi021     Document Type: Article

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