Strategic competition in sequential election contests

Public Choice

Volumn 111, Issue 3-4, 2002, Pages 377-397

  Strumpf, Koleman S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141675972     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014926113241     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Aldrich, J.H. (1979). A model of the U.S. presidential primary campaign. In S.J. Brams, A. Schotter and G. Schwodiauer (Eds.), Applied game theory. Physica-Verlag, Würzburg.
2. Aldrich, J.H. (1980). A dynamic model of presidential nomination campaigns. American Political Science Review 74: 651-669.
3. Aldrich, J.H. (1980). Before the convention: Strategies and choices in presidential nomination campaigns. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
4. Banerjee, A. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 797-817.
5. Bartels, L.M. (1988). Presidential primaries and the dynamics of public choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
6. Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). An economic model of representative democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 85-114.
7. Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100: 992-1026.
8. Brams, S.J. and Davis, M.D. (1982). Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries. Mathematical Social Sciences 3: 373-388.
9. Cooper, A. and Munger, M. (2000). The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence. Public Choice 103: 337-355.
10. Cukierman, A. (1991). Asymmetric information and the electoral momentum of public opinion polls. Public Choice 70: 181-213.
11. Dekel, E. and Piccione, M. (2000). Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. Journal of Political Economy 108: 34-55.
12. Federal Election Commission. (1977). Washington, DC. 1976 presidential campaign receipts and expenditures, no. 7., edition, 1977 FEC Disclosure Series.
13. Fudenberg, D., Gilbert, R., Stiglitz, J. and Tirole, J. (1983). Preemption, leapfrogging, and competition in patent races. European Economic Review 22: 3-31.
14. Heckelman, J. (2000). Sequential elections and overlapping terms: Voting for US senate. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 42: 97-108.
15. Levitt, S.D. (1994). Using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the U.S. House. Journal of Political Economy 102: 777-798.
16. McKelvey, R.D. and Ordeshook, P.C. (1985a). Sequential elections with limited information. American Journal of Political Science 29: 480-512.
17. McKelvey, R.D. and Ordeshook, P.C. (1985b). Elections with limited information: A fufilled expecations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. Journal of Economic Theory 36: 55-85.
18. Myerson, R.B. (1995). Analysis of democratic institutions: Structure, conduct and performance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 77-89.
19. Rosen, S. (1986). Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. The American Economic Review 76: 701-715.
20. Snyder, J.M. (1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. Econometrica 57: 637-660.
21. Wilcox, C. (1991). Financing the 1988 prenomination campaigns. In E.H. Buell Jr. and L. Sigelman (Eds.), Nominating the president. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press.