Superstition and rational learning

American Economic Review

Volumn 96, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 630-651

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Levine, David K ^b,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747648620     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.3.630     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Aoyagi, Masaki. "Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games." Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 70(2), pp. 444-69.
2. Aumann, Robert J. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality." Econometrica, 1987, 55(1), pp. 1-18.
3. Billingsley, Patrick. Probability and measure, 3rd ed. New York: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.
4. Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium." Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, 89(2), pp. 165-85.
5. Diaconis, Persi and Freedman, David. "On the Uniform Consistency of Bayes Estimates for Multinomial Probabilities." The Annals of Statistics, 1990, 75(3), pp. 1317-27.
6. Foster, Dean P. and Vohra, Rakesh V. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 27(1-2), pp. 40-55.
7. Fudenberg, Drew and Kreps, David M. "A Theory of Learning, Experimentation, and Equilibrium in Games." Unpublished Paper, 1988.
8. Fudenberg, Drew and Kreps, David M. "Learning in Extensive Form Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium." Unpublished Paper, 1994, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/papers.html
9. Fudenberg, Drew and Kreps, David M. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 8(1), pp. 20-55.
10. Fudenberg, Drew; Kreps, David M. and Levine, David K. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements." Journal of Economic Theory, 1988, 44(2), pp. 354-80.
11. Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium." Econometrica, 1993a, 61(3), pp. 523-45.
12. Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium." Econometrica, 1993b, 61(3), pp. 547-73.
13. Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112(2), pp. 507-36.
14. Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. "Conditional Universal Consistency." Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 29(1-2), pp. 104-30.
15. Hart, Sergiu. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction." Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 41(2), pp. 227-64.
16. Jehiel, Philippe and Samet, Dov. "Learning to Play Games in Extensive Form by Valuation." Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 124(2), pp. 129-48.
17. Kalai, Ehud and Neme, Alejandro. "The Strength of a Little Perfection." International Journal of Game Theory, 1992, 20(4), pp. 335-55.
18. Kreps, David M. and Wilson, Robert. "Sequential Equilibria." Econometrica, 1982, 50(4), pp. 863-94.
19. Kuhn, Harold W. "Extensive Games and the Problem of Information," in Harold W. Kuhn and Albert W. Tucker, eds., Contributions to the theory of games, Volume II (Annals of mathematics studies, 28). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, pp. 193-216.
20. Lambson, Val E. and Probst, Daniel A. "Learning by Matching Patterns." Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46(2), pp. 398-409.
21. Noldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction." Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5(3), pp. 425-54.
22. Rubinstein, Ariel and Wolinsky, Asher. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability." Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 5(2), pp. 299-311.
23. Selten, Reinhard. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games." International Journal of Game Theory, 1975, 4(1), pp. 25-55.