Evolution of beliefs and the nash equilibrium of normal form games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 444-469

  Aoyagi, Masaki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030209607     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0098     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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5. 5. J. S. Jordan, Three problems in learning mixed-strategy nash equilibria, Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993), 368-386.
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8. 8. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games, Games Econ. Behav. 3 (1991), 82-100.
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10. 10. D. Monderer and L. Shapley, Potential games, mimeo, UCLA and Technion, 1992.
11. 11. J. Robinson, An iterative method of solving a game, Ann. Math. 54 (1951), 296-301.
12. 12. L. S. Shapley, Some topics in two-person games, in "Advances in Game Theory" (M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker, Eds.), pp. 1-28, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1964.