Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 227-264

  Hart, Sergiu ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Backward induction equilibrium; Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary stability; Games in extensive form; Games of perfect information; Mutation; Population games; Selection; Subgame perfect equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036869744     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00502-X     Document Type: Article

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