Should banks own equity stakes in their borrowers? A contractual solution to hold-up problems

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 30, Issue 10, 2006, Pages 2911-2929

  Mahrt Smith, Jan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Banking regulation; Banks; Capital structure; Outside equity; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747364290     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.12.003     Document Type: Article

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