The Importance of Bank Seniority for Relationship Lending

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 57-89

  Longhofer, Stanley D ^a   Santos, João A C ^b  

^a WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012897042     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1999.0272     Document Type: Article

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