Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 90-109

  Degryse, Hans ^a   Van Cayseele, Patrick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002812128     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1999.0278     Document Type: Article

References (37)

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