Career concerns, monetary incentives and job design

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 108, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 299-316

  Kaarbøe, Oddvar M ^a   Olsen, Trond E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

^b NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

Career concerns; Job design; Monetary incentives; Welfare effects

Indexed keywords

INCENTIVE; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 33746542142     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00453.x     Document Type: Article

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