Career concerns in teams

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 289-307

  Auriol, Emmanuelle ^a   Friebel, Guido ^c   Pechlivanos, Lambros ^b  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^b Health Economics Department   (Greece)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041876418     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/338240     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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