Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 113, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 118-130

  Cho, Seok Ju ^a   Duggan, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Stationary equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344198508     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00087-5     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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