Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 31-48

  Eraslan, Hülya ^a   Merlo, Antonio ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c CEPR ^*

Author keywords

Noncooperative bargaining; Stochastic games; Voting rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036206531     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2811     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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