Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 409-417

  Kamecke, Ulrich ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Best reply structure; Experimental design; Matching; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031534118     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01263281     Document Type: Article

References (3)

1. Cooper R, DeJong DV, Forsythe R, Ross TW (1995) Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games, mimeo, Boston University
2. Davis DD, Holt CA (1993) Experimental economics. Princeton
3. Kandori M (1992) Social norms and community enforcement. Review of Economic Studies 59:61-80