New macroeconomics and political science

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 9, Issue , 2006, Pages 425-453

  Iversen, Torben ^a   Soskice, David ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democratic governments; Economic policy; Inflation; Political business cycles; Unemployment

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745789045     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.072004.085858     Document Type: Review

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